









The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 











The Poetics of Reciprocity in Selected Fictions by J. M. 
Coetzee 
Arthur James Rose 
RSXARTOOI 
A minor dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award 
of the degree of Master of Arts in English Literature 
Faculty of Humanities 
University of Cape Town 
2007 
Compulsory Declaration 
This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any 
degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this 
dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has 
been cited and referenced. 












Introduction: Reciprocity and the Differend in the relationship between You and I 
Chapter One: "Beyond the scope of the law": The Differend in Waitingfor the 
Barbarians, Disgrace, and "At the Gate" 
Chapter Two: Taking Care in Age of Iron and Slow Man 
Chapter Three: Reciprocal Poetics: Genre and Language in Youth 




















My supervisor, Dr Carrol Clarkson, for stimulating discussion, correcting 
misapprehensions, and committing herself to countless hours of explanations, 
verifications, and stylistic adjustments. It is to the insights and energy she contributed 
that the work owes its many refinements. The mistakes remain my own. 
The University of Cape Town Funding Office for providing two bursaries, without 
which this project may not have been completed. 
The University of Cape Town English Department, whose contributions towards 
conference attendance allowed me to present Chapters Two and Three to peers and 
professionals in their proto-states. 
Those unnamed professionals at the conferences whose questions and observations 
redirected and refined my project. 
Jennifer Malec, Simon van Schalkwyk, Donald Powers, and Gareth Mannheimer for 
keeping me sane. 
My parents for their tireless support, financial and emotional. Without their financial 
assistance I could not have even begun this project. 











Introduction: Reciprocity and the Differend in the relationship 
between You and I 
I 
David Attwell, in the interview that prefaces "The Poetics of Reciprocity" 
section of Doubling the Point, identifies a recurrent concern with the function of 
reciprocity in the work of J. M Coetzee. 1 "The I-You relation ... connects with larger 
things in the whole of [Coetzee's] work, what I would like to call broadly the poetics 
of reciprocity." (Attwell 1992: 58) This dissertation seeks to examine the poetics of 
reciprocity as an aesthetic-ethical concern of Coetzee' s fiction. 
By establishing Coetzee's works as an extended critique of reciprocity in their 
thematic and structural elements, this dissertation presents a notion of reciprocity that 
acknowledges both an ethical imperative to engage with others and the aesthetic 
problems of depicting that ethical engagement in art. The aim of the dissertation is 
therefore to show the use of a poetics of reciprocity in raising and examining 
particular ethical and aesthetic issues in Coetzee' s work. 
Reciprocity, in an I-You relation, relies on the co-dependence of the / and the 
You? Coetzee explores the possibility of reciprocity in his examination of I and You 
in his essay-translation "Achterberg's 'Ballade van de gasfitter': The Mystery of! and 
You. ,,3 As the preliminary step to understanding the poem, Coetzee suggests reading 
'Ballad of the Gasfitter' "in the Romantic tradition as the search of [a] plenary, 
undefined I (embodying itself in the course of the poem in various ways) for an 
enigmatic but necessary You." (Coetzee 1992: 72) The You is a necessary 
correspondent to the I. The two correspond to form the combination word /-You, on 
which the identities of both I and You are contingent. 
Coetzee derives this relation from the work of the Jewish theologian, Martin 
Buber: 
The "primary word," says Buber, is not / but "/-Thou," 
the word of "natural combination" denoting a relation between 
I and You antedating the objectification of You into It and the 
isolation of I into a being "at times more ghostly than the dead 











Notwithstanding his use of Buber to describe the mutual dependence of the I 
and the You, Coetzee's treatment of the You denies the reciprocity implicit in Buber's 
use of the "primary word." For, in Coetzee's description, 
The You has little solidity to the gaze of the 1. On the 
contrary, the You is absent; or is present only passively, as an 
object of the awareness of the I; or is capable only of an 
inactive locativity defined in relation to the 1. In other words, 
the You is absent or evanescent or dependent on the I; and the 
relation of I to You, being barely transitive, cannot be 
reciprocal. (Coetzee 1992: 72-73) 
Coetzee's You is defined by its relation to the I that narrates it into being. 
Referring to a You, concomitantly, cannot lead to a reciprocal relation between it and 
the referrer because their relative position as object and subject inhabits a discourse 
where power positions are not interchangeable: the speech of the I invariably fills and 
dominates the silence of the You. 
Jean-Fran90is Lyotard identifies the I-You relation as similarly asymmetrical: 4 
By turning the I into its you, the other makes him- or 
herself master, and turns the I into his or her hostage ... The I, 
placed in the position of you, is someone to whom a 
prescription is addressed, the simple prescription that there be 
prescriptions (and not only descriptions, not only cognitions). 
The I in this situation learns nothing, since there is nothing to 
learn (a command is not a bit of information). The I does not 
even know if the other is also an I, nor does the I know what 
the other wants from the I nor even if the other wants 
something from the I, but the I is immediately obligated to the 
other. This is what the I's displacement onto the you instance 
marks: You ought to. (Lyotard 1988: 111) 
Lyotard transposes the ethical obligation on the I into linguistic terms: "An 
addressor appears whose addressee I am, and about whom I know nothing, except that 
he or she situates me upon the addressee instance." (Lyotard 1988: 110) The situation 











instance of the addressee - is not one of symmetrical reciprocity. It replaces the ego 
with the other; but the other, in its ethical call on the ego, also dominates the ego. The 
I is replaced with a you, without relieving the asymmetric linguistic affect of the you: 
objectification and dependence. The relationship remains unreciprocated. 
Either the relationship is dictated by psychological integrity, leading to the 
domination of the ego over the other, or it is a response to the ethical "call" of the 
other, which results in the other dominating the ego. Despite the two interpretations' 
mutual exclusivity, both signal a failure of reciprocity in the I-You relationship. 
It is a failure with which Coetzee's novels engage. Insofar as Coetzee's works 
function according to a poetics of reciprocity, they engage with the contexts where 
reciprocity succeeds, and where it fails. The poetics of reciprocity examines an 
aesthetic depiction of reciprocity influenced by the ethical concerns reciprocity raises. 
David Attwell identifies In the Heart of the Country as an examination of "the 
ontological consequences of settler-colonialism's lack of social reciprocity.,,5 
Without the cultural mechanisms whereby a stable 
identity can be formed through the reflections of self thrown 
back by others, Magda speaks an obsessive interior 
monologue that rarely resembles a language of social 
intercourse. The numbered units of her discourse reflect this 
lack of reciprocity ... (Attwell 1993: 58) 
Magda's criticism of her father, that he destroys the few words that are "true, 
rock-hard enough to build a life on," is a criticism of his attempt to dissociate the 
servant Klein-Anna and himself from his daughter and his cuckolded servant, 
Hendrik. 6 "He believes that he and she can choose their words and make a private 
language with an I and you and here and now of their own." (Coetzee 2004: 38 Para 
74) Contrary to the father's opinion, "there can be no private language", 
Their intimate you is my you too. Whatever they may 
say to each other, even in the closest dead of night, they say in 
common words, unless they gibber like apes. How can I speak 
to Hendrik as before when they corrupt my speech? How do I 











The interaction between father and servant becomes, in Magda's description, a 
violation of several codes of behaviour: a transgression of the master-servant divide, 
an infringement of marital obligations, and a corruption of interpersonal relationships. 
She chooses to describe the interaction linguistically; the I and the You are figures 
representing the importunate behaviour in dissociated, abstract terms. 
While Attwell is correct in identifying the narrative style as an "interior 
monologue that rarely resembles a language of social intercourse," Magda's 
realisation that she shares "common words" with her father and their servants 
indicates the tension between the desired reciprocity implicit in a common language 
and the dissociative function language may have when employed to either categorise 
or exclude its referents. 
The dissociative function of language in this interlude is particularly clear in the 
South African edition: 
He believes that he and she can choose their words and 
make a private language, with an ek andjy and hier and nou of 
their own. But there is no private language. Their jy is my jy 
too. 7 
The South African edition, published in 1978 by Ravan Press, differs from its 
United Kingdom forebear in the language of its dialogues. The Seeker & Warburg 
edition (UK) features a few Afrikaans words, primarily to designate a South African 
context to the otherwise nebulous location of Magda's farm. All the characters in the 
Ravan Press edition speak in Afrikaans. The exception, as Derek Attridge notes in 
JM Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading: Literature in the Event, is the father's bride 
who, in paragraph 11, speaks English. 8 
Coetzee translates the Afrikaans jy as the "intimate you" in the UKIUS editions. 
By calling the servant an "intimate you" in the UKIUS editions, Magda's father 
transgresses the taboo on master/servant relationships: he undermines the relationship 
that provides master and servant with the fixed sense oftheir position in the world. 
The infraction in the South African edition, however, is the father's decision to let the 
servant refer to him as jy. Jy, as opposed to the more reverential u, is traditionally the 
Afrikaans referent for either an equal or an inferior. It is the servant's use ofjy that is 
particularly problematic: the father's break with social convention has consequential 











The dialogue that entrenches the relationship of baas and servant in paragraph 
41 leads Magda to comment: "Men's talk is so unruffled, so serene, so full of 
common purpose." (Coetzee 2004: 22 Para 42) With his linguistic infraction, 
however, Magda's father undermines the "common purpose" that guides talk between 
master and servant. Moreover, he commits a far greater offense by failing to 
anticipate Magda's inclusion within this collapse of linguistic divisions. The 
reciprocity between master and mistress, provided by their exclusive claim to a 
linguistic supremacy, is betrayed when both master and servant fail to realise the 
repercussions of their illicit use of reciprocal "jy' s." 
There is a poetics of reciprocity insofar as the reciprocal relations between 
father and daughter, and master and servant, are examined within the aesthetic 
confines of the text. "Theirjy is my jy too" is a phrase that emphasises Magda's plea 
for a common language. But it also shows the conditions of that plea: the repetition of 
the jy links the possessive "their" with the possessive "my." The deictic "jy" that 
belongs to "them" is the same as the deictic "jy" that belongs to "me." The reciprocal 
relations, undermined between master, mistress, and servant by the misuse ofjy, are 
improved between the father, Magda, and Klein-Anna: it is, however, in Magda's 
capacity as narrator of the text, rather than as mistress, that justifies her claim to the 
jy. 
The poetics that lead to reciprocal linguistic relations in Magda's narrative are 
undermined by the instability of their linguistic base. Magda'sjy may be different to 
the jy of her father and their servants; denied the English of her internal monologue 
when she engages in dialogue, she must claim the jy of her society despite her desire 
for an "intimate [English] you." Attridge's suggestion that Magda may be "an English 
speaker, for whom Afrikaans is a necessary instrument in practical matters" is an 
unresolved possibility of the text. (Attridge 2005: 22) In either instance (and In the 
Heart of the Country is a text where both "either" and "or" may be held to be the 
case) there is a reciprocal relation in Coetzee's use of the "intimate you" and the "jy." 
"Their intimate you is my you too" suggests that with the intimacy in the I-You 
relationship between master and servant, the 1-You relation of father and daughter has 
lost its intimacy. (Coetzee 2004: 38 Para 74) That point is consistent across the 
phrases from both editions. However, in her claim to the intimate you, Magda turns 
the "intimate you" into a "you." The intimacy of the you is lost. Magda intrudes on the 











the possibility of general, indiscriminate you. A sense of reciprocity is retained; there 
is still a common understanding of you. But the understanding of you is no longer 
intimate; it is prescribed by the circumstances of Magda's narration. 
Magda's feelings of exclusion within the context of her father's interactions 
with Klein-Anna have their counterpart in the exclusion of the father and the servant 
from positions of agency in telling their story. In an interior monologue, the narrator's 
voice presides over the actions of her narrative objects. Magda's story, divided as it is 
into contradictory snapshots, exacerbates this function to a point where the only 
action the novel confirms is Magda's narrating it into existence. For the "narrative 
objects" - the marriages of the father and Hendrik, the murder of the father and his 
bride/mistress, Hendrik's rape of Magda - are told multiple times, as completely 
separate, often conflicting, incidents. The only link between the sections is a stylistic 
consistency of narratorial voice, labelled Magda. In this, at least, she realises her wish 
to be "the medium, the median ... Neither master nor slave, neither parent nor child, 
but the bridge between." (Coetzee 2004: 145 Para 256) But in being "the medium", 
she is also the I in the asymmetrical relationship of I and You. No one will speak to 
her in the true language of the heart because she, as the authority of the work, is 
incapable of reciprocal relationships with her fellow characters: the characters over 
which she wields narratorial authority. 
The discrepancy between attempting to demonstrate reciprocity in a work, and 
failing to do so, is a concern of Coetzee's writing on writing. In an interview with 
Thorold and Wickstead, quoted in Teresa Dovey's introduction to J M Coetzee: A 
Bibliography, Coetzee articulates a position on writing, and the response to writing, 
that leads the discussion of reciprocity and its failure to the problem of discourse: 
It seems to me that what you're trying to do is absorb 
certain novels, my novels, into a political discourse ... And it's 
perhaps a mark of all critical activity to try to swallow one 
kind of discourse into another kind of discourse. For example, 
in academic criticism, to swallow literature into a certain kind 
of academic discourse ... And what I'm now resisting is the 
attempt to swallow my novels into a political discourse. 
Because I'm not prepared to concede that the one kind of 
discourse is larger or more primary than the other. So that 











book of mine - let's assume for a moment there is an intention 
there - into some wider or more all-embracing, more 
swallowing, notion of social intention - I have to resist them 
because, frankly, my allegiances lie with the discourse ofthe 
novels and not with the discourse of politics.9 
Any attempt to articulate meaning outside of context leads to the absorption of 
the text into an architext: an I that rejects the differences of the individual text, so as 
to create a generic you. 10 Reciprocity requires that the differences be acknowledged; 
that the you be granted an I status. However, categorising the differences would lead 
to a re-absorption of the text into a generic type. A space must rather be created in 
content, language, and genre to accommodate those differences that grant a literary 
text its uniqueness, despite content, language, and genre. To create the space in which 
the differences may be suggested without being articulated, I use Lyotard's notion of 
the differend as a term with nominal correspondence to the issues I raise. 
II 
Raising the notion of the differend creates an aporia in the fractured relation 
between the I and the You or I-become-You. "The differend," writes Lyotard, "is the 
unstable state and instant of language wherein something which must be able to be put 
into phrases cannot yet be." (Lyotard 1988: 13) 
This state includes silence, which is a negative phrase, 
but it also calls upon phrases which are in principle possible. 
This state is signalled by what one ordinarily calls a feeling: 
"One cannot find the words," etc. A lot of searching must be 
done to find new rules for forming and linking phrases that are 
able to express the differend disclosed by the feeling ... What 
is at stake in a literature, in a philosophy, a politics perhaps, is 
to bear witness to differends by finding idioms for them. 
(Lyotard 1988: 13) 
By naming the "feeling" a differend, one at least signals the elision in language 











a differend at least provides the hearer of the call an awareness of the gap that its 
absence forms, even as it identifies injustices of discourse that, for want of 
articulation, are not considered injustices: "I would like to call a differend the case 
where the plaintiff is divested of the means to argue and becomes for that reason a 
victim." (Lyotard 1988: 9) 
Identifying a reciprocal relationship between the 1 and the You seems only 
possible when the 1 and the You are interchangeable. But making the 1 interchangeable 
with the You - making the I-become- You - results in the 1 having an existence similar 
to the You as Coetzee describes it. In fact, within such parameters, any effort to elide 
the power of the 1 would merely replace the referent of the 1: the inversion of subject 
and object would not affect the presence of a power imbalance. By referring to the 
relationship as an instance of the differend, however, the Fs domination ofthe You, or 
the Other's call for the obligation of the I-become-You, is upset by the cognisance that 
the You has a potential voice, albeit elided from the discourse of linguistic 
signification, whose silence forms a reciprocal response to the discourse of the 1. 
The potential reciprocity between the speaking 1 and the silent You is 
demonstrated in the relationship between a writer and his or her readers. If there is a 
responsibility to which the writer is answerable; it remains, however it is articulated, 
primarily a responsibility to write. "The only responsibility of artists, writers, or 
philosophers," writes Jean-Franyois Lyotard, 
is a responsibility towards the question, What is 
painting, writing, thought? .. Their addressee is not the public, 
and, I would say, not even the "community" of artists, writers, 
and so forth. To tell the truth, they do not know who their 
addressee is, and this is what it is to be an artist, a writer, and 
so forth: to throw a "message" out into the void. I I 
A message, if one returns to Roman Jakobson's model, requires an addressor, an 
address, and an addressee. It is only in retrospect, on examining the completed work 
and becoming addressee of his or her own address, that the author can claim authority 
over the complete "message." Coetzee expresses some concern over claims to 
authority: 
What I say is marginal to the book, not because I as 











it would be said from a position peripheral, posterior to the 
forever unreclaimable position from which the book was 
written. 12 
The writer communicates his or her understanding of "what is writing" in his or 
her fiction insofar that the written piece functions as a trace of the act of writing. 
Attempts at capturing the moment of writing after the fact through retrospective 
claims or analyses represent the trace of the writing action, not the act itself. 
In "The Novel Today" Coetzee says, 
A story is not a message with a covering, a rhetorical or 
aesthetic covering. It is not a message plus a residue, the 
residue, the art with which the message is coated with the 
residue, forming the subject matter of rhetoric or aesthetics or 
literary appreciation. There is no addition in stories. They are 
not made up of one thing plus another thing, message plus 
another thing, message plus vehicle, substructure plus 
superstructure ... There is always a difference, and the 
difference is not a part ... the difference is everything. 13 
Acknowledgment of the potential voice - a voice that exists only in the terms of 
its potentiality - occurs in the reciprocal implications carried by the differend. While 
the differend marks the instance where a voice has been elided from a discourse, it 
implicitly acknowledges the aporia or vacuum in the lack of voice - the existence of a 
voice that could exist but for its non-recognition within a particular discourse. This 
dissertation focuses on those poetics of reciprocity surrounding narratives of elided 
vOIces. 
This is not the first study to anticipate the potential of the differend as an 
explanatory tool for understanding elided voices. Benita Parry, in her essay, "Speech 
and Silence in the Fictions of J. M. Coetzee", suggests using the differend to explain 
the aporias that gesture toward elided voices,14 
Perhaps, then, [Coetzee's] narrative solutions stage the 
process of occluding contending enunciations, of disavowing 
other knowledges, of constructing and holding in place a 











other - Lyotard's notion of a speech act in which the 
addressee is divested of the means to dispute this address. 
(Parry 1996: 40) 
Parry's reasoning for not pursuing the differend as a theoretical tool stems from 
her belief that Coetzee's ironic use of the solipsistic discourses of "diary, journal, and 
letter" leads to his situating the "dominated" of his novels "as objects of 
representations and meditations which offer them no place from which to resist the 
modes that have constituted them as at the same time naked to the eye and occult." 
(Parry 1996: 41) Addressing the "dominated" as allegories of Lyotard' s differend 
leads to her criticism that the writing itself divests them "of the means to dispute this 
address." The distinction that needs to be made is between the content of the stories 
and their method of relation: the distinction between the events narrated within the 
narrative and the event of narrating the narrative. To demonstrate this distinction, this 
study examines the situations in which dominant voices in the event of narrating the 
narrative are marginalised in the events that take place in the narrative. Although it 
excludes, variously, the barbarian girl, Melanie Isaacs, and Vercueil, it does so in 
order to focus on the primary characters marginalised by their circumstances. 
Tamlyn Monson's article, "An Infinite Question: The Paradox of 
Representation in Life & Times of Michael K", engages in a thorough examination of 
the significance of Lyotard's work in reading Coetzee's novel. 15 In a discussion that 
navigates the correlations between Lyotard, Emmanuel Levinas, and Maurice 
Blanchot, Monson identifies the problem that Life & Times raises: "In Coetzee's own 
drive to represent, in his intentional staging of the writer's encounter with the other, 
he exercises the very same powers of negation and self-constituting subjectivity 
engaged with thematically in the novel." (Monson 2003: 87) Following Mike 
Marais's article "Literature and the Labour of Negation: J. M. Coetzee's Life & Times 
of Michael K", Monson agrees that "the novel aims to portray the violence of 
subjectivity and the negation upon which representation is predicated." (Monson 
2003: 87) Monson extends Marais' argument in examining the consequences resulting 
from the paradox of representing alterity. For, according to Monson, if the "theme" of 
alterity is taken to its logical conclusion, the success of the work is contingent on the 











As a work dedicated to resisting representation and revelation 
as reductive and violent subjective mechanisms, Life & Times 
of Michael K fails the ethical cause by its purposeful 
existence, which annihilates the Absolute aspect of ethics by 
cementing it in words, making of ethics an exploitable theme 
to be dissected and displayed in a work of fiction. However 
this failure signals a loss of agency that forces the writer into a 
passivity that bears witness to the opposite of his labour ... 
[leading to] the escape of the Other. (Monson 2003: 103) 
As soon as the writer acknowledges some success in communicating that which 
he wishes to communicate, he betrays the ethics of his novel and undermines its 
significance with the totalising force of reason. Though she does not specify it at this 
point, the substance of Monson's essays suggest this to be a differend involved in the 
act of writing. 16 
However, bearing witness to a differend and endorsing it should not be mistaken 
for being the same thing. By expressing the occasion of differend, the writer may, 
through the action of his or her writing, also instantiate a discourse that works to 
undermine the narrated power of the differend in the manner that it is narrated. The 
writer, though concerned by the ethical consequences of attempting to represent the 
Other, cannot be passive in describing either situation or protagonist. Passivity, and I 
mean passivity in a colloquial sense, leads to the denial of the existence of such 
conflicts. 
The use of the differend as the means of describing the irresolvable conflicts 
that Coetzee writes into his fictions has a particularly allegorical function in this 
dissertation. But it is allegorical in a very specific sense. Derek Attridge, in resisting 
the urge to allegorise Coetzee' s fiction, warns that, 
Before relying too heavily on allegorization as a primary 
mode of interpretation, therefore, we need to ask how allegory 
is thematized in the fiction, and whether this staging of 
allegory as an issue provides any guidance in talking about 












The issue Attridge has with allegory is its tendency to collapse what he has 
called the singularity of literature - the complete and unique qualities of a particular 
work read in a particular space and time - into the mere representation of other works 
or ideas. So he cites an explicit reference to allegory in the second section of Life & 
Times of Michael K, "Your stay in the camp was merely an allegory, if you know that 
word. It was an allegory - speaking at the highest level- of how scandalously, how 
outrageously a meaning can take up residence in a system without becoming a term in 
it.,,18 Commentators, according to Attridge, have extrapolated upon this interpretation 
ofK's existence: though they have expressed hesitancy about relegating K to any 
position, often critics - Attridge (2005), Marais l9 inter alia - use K as a cipher for the 
subject that evades any subject position. Yet while Attridge may refer to the 
"otherness of K' s responses", he acknowledges that K "is the product of a specific 
history ... a history that is embedded in the discourses he employs and encounters, in 
the events of his life, in the social, economic, and political arrangements he resists." 
(Attridge 2005: 50; 58) K, in his life, is representative of his times. Marais, for all the 
care in his correlation of Levinas with Coetzee's work, associates l'Autrui (the wholly 
Other) with K in a manner that, ifnot directly allegorical, makes K the analogous 
manifestation of the Other. Thinking of his return to his farm, questioned about a 
source of water, K responds with a plan by which "one can live." (Coetzee 1998: 184; 
my emphasis) The ambiguity inherent in his reference "one" undermines the attempt 
to lodge him in a system of either interiority or exteriority, for he is neither wholly 
subject nor wholly other.2o 
Lyotard describes the differend as "a case of conflict, between (at least) two 
parties, that cannot be equitably resolved for lack of a rule of judgment applicable to 
both arguments." (Lyotard 1988: xi) "Differend", therefore, becomes a signifier of the 
disjuncture that exists between that which can be said and that which should be said. 
So, after demonstrating that a "wrong" is the incursion of damages without the means 
to prove it, Lyotard argues that the differend is a "case where the plaintiff is divested 
of the means to argue and becomes for that reason a victim." (Lyotard 1988: 9) 
Existing phrases are inadequate to a common explanation of the damages; the 
damages therefore become wrongs - damages that transgress the bounds of current 
idiom and therefore the bounds of legal action or legal defence. Moreover, as silences 
are themselves phrases or at least phrase-gaps, the decision to remain silent, when it is 











suffered by the victim. So the differend may also be described as the situation where 
one cannot or may not bear witness to an offence suffered because there is lacking a 
common point of reference which would make it remandable to a singular tribunal. 
The particular use of the differend, to reiterate, is in its bringing to light 
discrepancies between the event of narration and the event of narrative. Mikhail 
Bakhtin clarifies this distinction as follows: 
Before us are two events - the event that is narrated in 
the work and the event of narration itself (we ourselves 
participate in the latter, as listeners or readers); these events 
take place in different times (which are marked by different 
durations as well) and in different places, but at the same time 
these two events are indissolubly united in a single but 
complex event that we might call the work in the totality of all 
its events, including the external material givenness of the 
work, and its text, and the world represented in the text, and 
the author-creator and the listener or reader; thus we perceive 
the fullness ofthe work in all its wholeness, and indivisibility, 
but at the same time we understand the diversity of the 
elements that constitute it. 21 
This thesis focuses particularly on narrated events that marginalise characters 
responsible for or involved in the event of narration. So in Chapter One the discussion 
of Waiting for the Barbarians focuses on the Magistrate, while the section on 
Disgrace examines David Lurie's trial. Similarly the focus of Chapter Two is on the 
responsibilities and realisations of Mrs Curren and Paul Rayment when it discusses an 
ethic of gratitude in Age of Iron and Slow Man. Finally the examination of Youth in 
Chapter Three excludes possible ancillary discussions about parodic genres and their 
correspondent settings when it establishes Coetzee' s reticence about generic 
structures in his second autobiographical fiction. The concomitant effect is that the 
discussion elides those figures that have been identified in Coetzee criticism as Other 












Coetzee denies writing to a preconceived end when he says in an interview with 
Attwell on "Autobiography and Confession," "the feel of writing fiction is one of 
freedom, of irresponsibility, or better, of responsibility to something that has not yet 
emerged, that lies somewhere at the end ofthe road.,,22 
But identifying a poetics necessitates bringing a pattern of reading into 
existence. Coetzee observes, in referring to a poetics of failure, that a poetics is "a 
programme for constructing artifacts." (Coetzee 1992: 87) The artifice of poetics lies 
in its retrospective construction of a rationale or protocol for the fiction. Poetics is the 
pattern imposed on an existing work, which is then credited as the preconceived 
"message" of the author. 
Coetzee expresses his concern with this imposition when, in his interview on 
Kafka, he declines to take up a position of authority in relation to Life & Times of 
Michael K. 
What Michael K says, if it says anything, about 
asserting the freedom oftextuality, however meagre and 
marginal that freedom may be, against history (history ... as a 
society's collective self-interpretation of its coming-into-
being) stands by itself against anything I might say about what 
it says. (Coetzee 1992: 206) 
Attempts to interpret a work must simultaneously acknowledge their 
retrospective imposition of sense, and the necessity of this imposition to the critical 
enterprise. For if stories avoid the predetermined outcome, "criticism, on the other 
hand," has for Coetzee, the "responsibility toward a goaL .. set for me not only by the 
argument, not only by the whole philosophical tradition into which I am implicitly 
inserting myself, but also by the rather tight discourse of criticism itself." (Coetzee 
1992: 246) The "tight discourse of criticism" requires a predetermined series of steps 
for its argument: a programme by which artefacts or ideas are constructed. 
In examining the "poetics of reciprocity" in Coetzee's works, the "tightness" of 
critical discourse obfuscates the care with which Coetzee creates reciprocal 
relationships between characters, discourses and genres. "Writing [fiction]," Coetzee 











speech with them." (Coetzee 1992: 64) Critical discourse is about centring those 
voices to a particular thematic end. 
When a Samuel Beckett writes his books without caring 
whether they are understood, when a Jerome Lindon dares to 
publish them, and when the ministry passes a law that allows 
one to find them in bookstores, this is how a testimony to the 
differend in literature can find its addressees. (Lyotard 1993: 
10) 
In his "Jerusalem Prize Acceptance Speech", Coetzee identifies the Colour Bar 
Act as the legal means of restricting intercourse between master and slave to giving 
d .. d 23 an receIvmg or ers. 
What was the meaning of this deeply symbolical law? Its 
origins, it seems to me, lie in fear and denial: denial of an 
unacknowledgeable desire to embrace Africa, embrace the 
body of Africa; and a fear of being embraced in return by 
Africa. (Coetzee 1992: 97) 
Although it is the law that refuses to recognise either master or slave as 
anything but master or slave, the law stems from the fear or denial of love. Moreover 
it is "a failure of love" on the part of the masters that leads to their suffering the 
confinement of their own legal system. 
The failure oflove, the second chapter of this dissertation will argue, is a failure 
of care. The failure of care is not merely the failure to care; it is the failure to care 
while acknowledging the liberty and equality of those who are cared for. Care and 
love, in Coetzee's writings, come together in their mutual requirement for reciprocity. 
The failure of love and care is a failure to allow the feeling to be reciprocated. 
The three chapters of this dissertation interrogate the occurrence of three kinds 
of differends in selected novels by J. M. Coetzee, and the specific poetics that leads 
each to its own realisation of reciprocity. 
The most obvious, and most consistent with the original concept of the 
differend, is the legal differend: presenting ajust but illegal case before courts and 
tribunals. Voices are denied their right to articulate their response to the law; as a 











way of example, I examine Waiting for the Barbarians and Disgrace; both of which 
feature protagonists silenced by the legal discourses of their societies. The differend 
occurs between the testimony that is not accepted by the authorities within the text 
and the testimony that the description of the trial occasions for the reader. The 
reciprocity the legal differend enables is reciprocity between the narrated event and 
the event of narration: a symmetrical engagement between the marginality of the 
protagonists' social situations and their dominance over their textual locations. 
The second differend occurs in an extra-legal setting, and forms the basis of 
reciprocal relations examined in Chapter Two. Chapter Two concerns itself 
principally with the recurrent use of the word "care" in Coetzee's work. By examining 
the use of the word, specifically in Age of Iron and Slow Man, and its concomitant 
conceptualisation in these two works, the chapter demonstrates the ambiguities 
existent in "taking care" and "care-taking". Mrs Curren, with her recourse to the 
etymologies of care and love, has been described by Coetzee himself as 
bringing to bear against the voices of history and historical 
judgment ... two kinds of authority: the authority of the dying 
and the authority of the classics. Both these authorities are 
denied and even derided in her world: the first because hers is 
a private death, the second because it speaks from long ago 
and far away. (Coetzee 1992: 250) 
Not only is this denial of Mrs Curren's argument a further instance of the 
differend, it also provides a starting point for an examination of the differend as more 
than merely a legal situation. For the extra-legal consequences of the differend imply 
the need to examine the conflicts that occur, that the situations of victims may be 
expressed in a way that does not resolve itself with a final, unequivocal, judgment. 
So a contest is staged, not only in the dramatic construction of 
the novel but also within Elizabeth's - what shall I say?-
soul, a contest about having a say. To me as a writer, as the 
writer in this case, the outcome of this contest - what is to 
count as a classic in South Africa - is irrelevant. What matters 
is that the contest is staged, that the dead have their say, even 











So: even in an age of iron, pity is not silenced. (Coetzee 1992: 
250) 
But there must also be some treatment of the response to the staging process. If 
pity is dealt with, one must also deal with the consequences of pity. By formulating 
the discussion around Coetzee' s use of care and the significance of the need to stage 
the vicissitudes that surround the positive and the negative implications of care, this 
chapter examines how care becomes the ground of contest for the victims of the 
differend in an extra-legalistic sense. 
The third differend occurs when the subject attempts to distance him- or herself 
from the situation in which he or she is involved. For, while the choice may be made 
to distance oneself from one's society, the "unfreedom" of that society may inculcate 
itself into the discourse of that self in such a way as to prohibit the clean break 
desired. The voice of the self, therefore, is itself in conflict with the wishes and 
desires of that self. The self, trying to flee the "irresistible" "crudity oflife in South 
Africa", is unable to escape the linguistic trap that the discourse of the voice, infused 
by a "South African accent", creates. (Coetzee 1992: 99) Chapter Three examines the 
consequences of attempting to deny the reciprocal relations that necessarily exist in 
generic origins: textual and cultural. Focussing its discussion on Youth, Chapter Three 
examines the necessity of reciprocal relations between individual and culture, and 
between text and type. 
As a postscript to this introduction, I would like to refer to a speech given by 
Coetzee at the opening of an art exhibition in Sydney entitled Voiceless: fleel 
therefore f am on the 21 5t of February 2007.24 In an address unmediated by Elizabeth 
Costello, Coetzee presents a similar argument to that presented by his fictional 
counterpart in "The Lives of Animals: The Philosophers and the Animals." I am not 
concerned with the potential the piece has for proving Costello Coetzee's amanuensis. 
Rather, it makes two points of particular importance to my conception of the poetics 
of reciprocity. 
Speaking of the Holocaust, and the adaptation in Nazi Germany of industrial 
stockyard methods to the "processing" of human beings, Coetzee said of the world's 
response: 
Of course we cried out in horror when we found out 











beings like cattle - if we had only known beforehand. But our 
cry should more accurately have been: what a terrible crime to 
treat human beings like units in an industrial process. And that 
cry should have had a postscript: what a terrible crime - come 
to think of it, a crime against nature - to treat any living being 
like a unit in an industrial process. (Coetzee 2007: 1) 
Reciprocity requires, at least, that the participants of a relationship do not treat 
each other as units. A work of literature engaged with a poetics of reciprocity requires 
a concomitant engagement with the ethical consequences of treating living beings like 
units in an industrial process. For, insofar as a work of literature has any truth-value, 
bearing witness to differends in the work's internal workings has a corollary in the 
reciprocity that ought to be between living beings. 
A final note. The campaign of human beings for animal 
rights is curious in one respect: the creatures on whose behalf 
human beings are acting are unaware of what their benefactors 
are up to and, if they succeed, are unlikely to thank them. 
There is even a sense in which animals do not know what is 
wrong - they certainly do not know what is wrong in the same 
way that humans do. 
Thus, however close the well-meaning benefactor may 
feel to animals, the animal rights campaign remains a human 
project from beginning to end. (Coetzee 2007: 2) 
The human project requires that the relationships between creatures are 
observed and documented. This dissertation is an attempt to indicate how Coetzee's 
fiction creates that space; how "a man-who-writes reacts," in fiction, "to the situation 
he finds himself in of being without authority, writing without authority," yet needing 
h .. 25 to S ow some recIprocIty. 
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Chapter One: "Beyond the scope of the law": The Differend in 
Waiting/or the Barbarians, Disgrace, and "At the Gate" 
Two traditions, it seems to me, converge and reinforce each other in the journalistic 
interview. The first is legal: the interview is a politer version of courtroom 
interrogation, or better, the interrogation the magistrate conducts prior to the public 
trial. 
1.M. Coetzee "Interview: The Poetics of Reciprocity" 
This chapter seeks to establish parameters for assessing the reciprocal 
relationships that selected works set up between individual and authority. By using 
Waitingfor the Barbarians, Disgrace, and "At the Gate" as case examples, I examine 
the failure of reciprocal relations between individuals and legal authorities. It is 
specifically a failure within the narrative for, as I demonstrate, Coetzee's poetics 
subverts the history of asymmetric relations in the mode of its production. While 
reciprocity fails in the what of Coetzee' s texts, he reinstates the symmetry of 
relationships in the how of their production. While Coetzee's stories carry many 
injustices, the way in which Coetzee presents them grants certain marginalised 
characters the ability to respond to their persecutors. 
Coetzee's comparison of an interview to an interrogation, prior to public trial, is 
preceded by a description that critiques the unreciprocal nature of the genre: 
An interview is not just, as you call it, an "exchange": it 
is, nine times out often (this is the tenth case, thank God!), an 
exchange with a complete stranger, yet a stranger permitted by 
the conventions of the genre to cross the boundaries of what is 
proper in conversation between strangers ... Interviewers want 
speech, a flow of speech. That speech they record, take away, 
edit, censor, cutting out all its waywardness, till what is left 
conforms to a monologic ideal. I 
The mono logic ideal of which Coetzee speaks is the authority assumed by the 
interviewer over the text of the interview: not only does the average interviewer adopt 
an untoward familiarity with his or her subject, he or she assumes precisely the 
position of "the subject supposed to know" that the serious writer steps down from in 
writing. (Coetzee 1992: 65) The interview functions like the trial rather than the text 











subject supposed to know." The writer, ifhe or she is to be true to the countervoices 
evoked or to the task of bearing witness to differends, cannot be a subject who knows: 
he or she must be a subject willing to acknowledge that he or she might not know, that 
there may be others who may occupy the subject position. 
Next to the prison of Nathaniel Hawthorne's The Scarlet Letter, a rose tree 
withers and blooms with the passing of the seasons. Hawthorne allegorises in its 
blooming the possibility of finding some moral to his story, the rose "may serve, let 
us hope, to symbolize some sweet moral blossom, that may be found along the track, 
or relieve the darkening close of a tale of human frailty and sorrow. ,,2 Although the 
encounters with the law in, variously, Waitingfor the Barbarians, Disgrace, and "At 
the Gate" might similarly be described as "tales of human frailty and sorrow", 
Coetzee is careful not to represent sources of solace and relief with such impunity. 
Crucially Hawthorne's use of allegory "may" serve as relief; he suggests that 
allegorical readings of his work, while possible, are not essential. Coetzee's narratives 
though they retain an allegorical bent - albeit increasingly focused within an 
identifiable and contemporaneous time and space - do accord with an anti-allegorical 
impulse in resisting the relief that allegorical explanation may bring. Insofar as they 
resist a moral certitude, Derek Attridge makes an important point in arguing that 
Coetzee's works "resist allegory.,,3 It must however be noted that this resistance to 
allegory should not negate the work's potency in critiquing existent conditions of 
torture and brutality.4 Despite resistance within the works to the "relief' of 
allegorisation, I apply the term "differend" allegorically to Coetzee's texts so as to 
describe the concern they have with transgressing the bounds set by authority. 
The Magistrate of Waitingfor the Barbarians responds to his guard's news that 
houses are being tom down in order to build cells with the wry comment, "time for 
the black flower of civilisation to bloom." (Coetzee 2004: 86) The line recalls the first 
chapter of Hawthorne's romance, The Scarlet Letter: 
Before this ugly edifice ... was a grass-plot, much 
overgrown with ... unsightly vegetation, which evidently 
found something congenial in the soil that had so early borne 












The edifice to which Hawthorne refers is specifically the prison of Salem5, but 
the tenor of the metaphor - "a prison" - critiques the prison as a general aspect of 
"civilized society". So he begins his second paragraph, 
The founders of a new colony, whatever Utopia of 
human virtue and happiness they might originally project, 
have invariably recognized it among their earliest practical 
necessities to allot a portion of the virgin soil as a cemetery, 
and another portion as the site of a prison (Hawthorne 1937: 
112) 
The irony is telling: the sincerity of a society's ideals may have little bearing on 
the practicalities oftheir enactment. Coetzee's use of this second quotation to 
introduce his essay, "Into the Dark Chamber: The Writer and the South African 
State", prompts an examination into the consequences of"practical necessities", no 
matter the intentions, upon the marginalised and the disenfranchised when the writer 
uses them for his aesthetic purposes.6 In the essay, Coetzee argues the case of the 
writer for whom, 
The deeper problem is not to allow himself to be 
impaled on the dilemma proposed by the state, namely, either 
to ignore its obscenities or else to produce representations of 
them. The true challenge is: how not to play the game by the 
rules of the state, how to establish one's own authority, how to 
imagine torture and death on one's own terms. (Coetzee 1992: 
364) 
"Establishing one's own authority" over the "game" of writing is an issue 
Coetzee feels to be of vital importance to a writer. Alan Penner quotes Coetzee as 
saymg: 
Whereas in the kind of game that I am talking about, 
you can change the rules if you are good enough. You can 
change the rules for everybody if you are good enough. You 











Lyotard likens the occurrence of the differend to "playing a game" according to 
a set of rules decided upon by an authority who does not adhere to them. (Lyotard 
1988: 19) The writer, writing fiction, identifies and describes differends through the 
"game-construction" of writing. By expressing them, the writer bears witness to their 
occurrence. Yet the authority that "changing the game" brings gives the writer the 
ability to create differends, or gaps in the discourse, of his characters. The subversive 
power of writing may also be used to trammel the voices of the oppressed. 
To subvert the rules of writing, the writer must be aware of the rules he or she is 
subverting. The "practical necessities" require that a novel has a beginning, middle 
and an ending, despite its infringement on the "endless chain of self-consciousness. ,,8 
Coetzee's response to questions of endless endings indicates their inadequacy to the 
novel. "Endings of this kind, endings that inform you that the text should be 
understood as going on endlessly, I find aesthetically inept." (Coetzee 1992: 248) 
However, the writer, as game player, must also resist writing conventions so as 
to subvert the prescriptive powers of genre on the text. This resistance to genre 
subverts the authority of the writer, but gains him or her textual autonomy in the 
devolution of the plot. Genre, like law, is as prescriptive and inescapable as a case of 
a differend.9 It may only be subverted by bearing witness to its presence. 
In the case of the differend, "where the plaintiff is divested of the means to 
argue and becomes for that reason a victim", there arises on the part of the plaintiff 
the need to "establish one's own authority" so as to eschew victimhood and regain 
agency. 10 (Lyotard 1988: 9) The writer responding to an oppressive regime must 
navigate the rules of the respective discourses by undermining them rather than by 
ignoring their obscenities or producing representations of them. Consistency in the 
application of the correct genre to the correct phrase enables the identification of a 
differend as a differend. But in the conflict that occurs between the "correct" 
interpretation of the phrases of the marginalized individual and that interpretation 
taken by the legal authorities, in the totalizing genre of '"the law", the importance of 
the writer is to observe the existence of a differend, of an equivocal manner of reading 
the phrase, and of the resistance in the marginalized perspective to the homogenous 
nature of the State. 











The Magistrate's allusion to Hawthorne does not merely signify the depth of his 
reading. I I Nor does it function simply to indicate the comparative ignorance of the 
Magistrate's guard, who "does not understand." (Coetzee 2004: 86) It creates a 
moment of meta-textual insight wherein the recourse to literary forbears provides the 
Magistrate with some means of explaining the situation in which he finds himself. 
Nevertheless this moment is short-lived: the communique within the bounds of 
the text is unappreciated by its addressee. The guard fails to understand the overlap in 
contexts that makes the quote applicable. The consequence is a play on the notions of 
barbarism that inform the work's dealings with Other and Othering. 
English criticism has used the barbarian as a trope for the ill-educated, the 
uninitiated, and the marginal. Yet the stability of the term, "barbarian," is questioned 
in Waiting/or the Barbarians. For if barbarians are ill-educated then the guard is a 
"barbarian." If the barbarian is "uninitiated" or foreign then the culture of the Empire 
forces the Magistrate to become increasingly "barbaric." The noted example of the 
marginal barbarian, the barbarian girl, has an unlikely second in the Magistrate when 
he too becomes marginalised by the Empire. 
The roots of the first instance of barbarism are to be found in the work of 
Matthew Arnold. Arnold, in Culture and Anarchy, identified in 19th century British 
aristocracy a cultural barbarism. 12 He labelled the aristocrats "the Barbarians," and 
decried the superficiality of their practices: "all this culture (to call it by that name) of 
the Barbarians was an exterior culture mainly: it consisted principally in outward gifts 
and graces, in looks, manners, accomplishments, prowess." (Arnold 1999: 107) 
Barbarism, for Arnold, was indicated by illiteracy rather than the complete absence of 
culture. According to Arnold, therefore, the guard's inability to catch the meaning of 
the Magistrate's words is tantamount to his being a barbarian. 
The Magistrate uses lines from Hawthorne to make sense of his change in 
circumstances. By invoking Hawthorne, and more importantly the trace of 
Hawthorne's ironic treatment of "Utopias" built on cemeteries and prisons, the 
Magistrate distances himself from the discourse of his guards, who "do not 
understand." The content of his statement, therefore, is not directed as a 
communication with his guard, though his guard may be the apparent addressee. The 
guard's ignorance, which may be taken as a synecdoche for the general ignorance on 
the part of the state's officials, endorses the Magistrate's sense of elation: "my 











bond is broken, I am a free man." (Coetzee 2004: 85) The Magistrate's ironic use of 
the guard as a foil is a linguistic abuse of the man's ignorance. The Magistrate regains 
a sense of power over his captors, but it relies on using a similar shift in discourse, a 
creation of a similar differend, to that used by the Third Bureau against him. 
The Magistrate illustrates the barbarism of the Imperial forces in his description 
of the commanding officer, located behind the desk that once represented the 
Magistrate's authority: 
His insignia say that he is a warrant officer. 13 Warrant 
Officer in the Third Bureau: what does that mean? At a guess, 
five years of kicking and beating people; contempt for the 
regular police and for due process of law; a detestation of 
smooth patrician talk like mine. But perhaps I do him an 
injustice - I have been away from the capital for a long time. 
(Coetzee 2004a: 85 my emphasis) 
Denied justice, the Magistrate realises that he has the potential, by virtue of the 
power granted by his command of discourse, to deny justice in tum. His "smooth 
patrician talk" provides him with the verbal acuity to perpetuate, at least on the level 
of language, the injustices exercised against him as a body. Though the Warrant 
Officer sits behind the desk, it is the Magistrate who invokes the authoritative 
convention of asking, "Is there anything I can help you with?" (Coetzee 2004: 84) 
Moreover, his position as the first person narrator of his text provides the 
Magistrate with an added authority over the words used by others. So when the 
Warrant Officer accuses him of "treasonably consorting with the enemy", the 
Magistrate is able to reinterpret its meaning by shifting its context. (Coetzee 2004: 85) 
The phrase "treasonably consorting" becomes "a phrase out of a book", a parroting of 
rules and regulations. (Coetzee 2004: 85) 
The irony of this lies in the meta-textual connotations of finding a phrase like "a 
phrase out of a book" within the confines of a first person narrative. For the casual 
dismissal of the Warrant Officer's accusation implicitly undermines the authority to 
which the Magistrate himself makes a claim. For the "due process of law" that the 
Magistrate makes some appeal to, albeit in the negative, relies on "phrases out of 
books" like "treasonably consorting". On the level of the meta-textual the authority of 











such authority are both dependent on assigning some significance to "phrases out of a 
book". The authenticity ofthe Magistrate's narrative, therefore, is called into question 
by his fractured treatment of authority. His dismissal of the accusation by 
undermining the discourse from whence it comes has the concomitant effect of 
undermining the discourse on which he bases his appeal to the "due process of law." 
Fractures in the narrative occur at a basic level of identification. The narrating 
"I" of Waiting for the Barbarians is identified as a Magistrate. The absence of a 
proper name in the text effects a placement of his position and title as "magistrate" in 
the position of direct referent or name: Magistrate. He interrogates the identity of the 
Warrant Officer, otherwise unnamed until later in the novel, on the level of 
nomenclature. By means of the insignia on the officer's uniform, the Magistrate is 
able to deduce that he is a "Warrant Officer". The title of "warrant officer" becomes 
synonymous with his identity as "Warrant Officer". But, as the Magistrate puts it, 
"what does that meanT' The identity, the name, "Warrant Officer" may be described 
by a series of functions. A magistrate, however, must be treated differently: "the 
magistracy of a district is not a post that can be abandoned like a gatepost." (Coetzee 
2004, 85) Yet "the magistracy of a district" takes its authority from the state. It too 
may be described as a series of functions. When the Magistrate breaks his bond with 
the Empire, becomes a free man, the danger he worries about in salvation is the reality 
of his victimhood. For, by setting himself against the Empire, he identifies himself as 
the Empire's negative while simultaneously losing the identity of his function. In the 
first instance he becomes a non-entity and in the second he loses all but the trace of 
the referent, "Magistrate." His claim to identity is based on the same system that 
elides his speech; his questioning of the Empire undermines the claims to the 
magistracy that provide him with the closest thing he has to a proper noun. 
Dialogues with the Imperial officials further weaken his subject position. When 
he declares "I will defend myself in a court oflaw", the response is "will you?" This 
apparent reiteration is actually a shift in the power-relation of their discourse. For by 
changing the "I" into the "you" - turning the authoritative declaration into a question, 
from a determined "I will" to a "Will you?" - his questioners demonstrate how his 
voice, patrician or otherwise, has effectively been silenced by the dominant discourse. 
While the Magistrate reclaims some authority from his recourse to the classics 
and to literature, the very integrity of that authority is displaced when he marginalises 











is marginalised by the concomitant loss of identity that occurs when he loses his 
position within the Empire's power structure. 
Later, during his humiliating mock hanging, the Magistrate hears "a rustling in 
the leaves near [him]" and hears "a child's voice." (Coetzee 2004: 130). The laughter 
that the Magistrate hears comes from a very different source; it responds to the 
interpretation that his bellows, roars, and shouts are "calls" to "his barbarian friends": 
"That is barbarian language you hear." (Coetzee 2004: 133) The passive signifies two 
possibilities: he speaks the language of the Barbarians or he responds to the barbarity 
of his situation with those sounds of the body that resist semantic meaning. 14 
Rebecca Saunders has made a compelling argument about barbarian languages 
in "The Agony and the Allegory: The Concept of the Foreign, the Language of 
Apartheid, and the Fiction of 1. M. Coetzee.,,15 In the piece, she argues for the 
connection between the barbarian, the foreigner, and language: "The paradigmatic 
foreigner in Western tradition - the barbarian - is one who speaks a different 
language." (Saunders 2001: 216) She quotes 1 ulia Kristeva, 
"It is precisely with respect to laws that foreigners 
exist." This legal definition, in which "foreigner" means one 
who is not a citizen, "allows one to settle by means of laws the 
prickly passions aroused by the intrusion of the other in the 
homogeneity of a family or a group"; it renders "natural" and 
thus indisputable the idea that others do not have the same 
rights that I do (or, conversely, that I am not entitled to the 
rights that others are). (Saunders 2001: 220) 
Turning someone into a "barbarian" not only distances that person from the 
reciprocal relationships between equals, it also provides the legal justification to deny 
their right to claim reciprocal rights. Notwithstanding the differences between 
strangers, foreigners and barbarians, it is clear that Coetzee sets up the "barbarian" as 
the estranged of the Empire. The lack of "culture" beyond the borders of the empire 
relegates all peoples from outside the Empire to the position of the barbarian. 
Applying the differend - the term used to describe an infraction of justice, 
which the law cannot identity as an infraction - as a label to the situation identifies in 
the Magistrate's plight the aporia existing between an intrinsic claim to humanity and 











to treat him like an animal. He is narrated into the position of barbarian by the 
discourse of the Empire. However, the narrating authority permitted to him by the 
novel discloses to the reader the disjuncture between the Empire's discourse and his 
own. 
Despite this, his torture is such that even his narrating voice becomes 
dissociated from the experiences of his body: 
The noise comes out of a body that knows itself 
damaged perhaps beyond repair and roars its fright. Even if all 
the children of the town should hear me I cannot stop myself: 
let us only pray that they do not imitate their elders' games, or 
tomorrow there will be a plague of little bodies dangling from 
the trees. (Coetzee 2004: 133) 
The Magistrate's bellows form speech without words, reaching into the silence 
of his marginality. Yet, because they communicate beneath the level of semantic 
function, his barbarian sounds cannot crack, strain, or break. Their vocative, wordless 
nature precludes their representation in the form of writing - Coetzee does not attempt 
to include them into his narrative - but it also frees them from the "decay" of 
articulation. As the response ofthis particular body, the sounds have a particularity of 
time and space. However, as the noise "of a body", it becomes a universal response to 
a universal set of conditions. "In the differend, something "asks" to be put into 
phrases, and suffers from the wrong of not being able to be put into phrases right 
away." (Lyotard 1988: 13) But the pain of the body cannot be put into phrases: 
The human beings who thought they could use language 
as an instrument of communication learn through the feeling 
of pain which accompanies silence ... that they are summoned 
by language, not to augment to their profit the quantity of 
information communicable through existing idioms, but to 
recognise that what remains to be phrased exceeds what they 
can presently phrase, and that they must be allowed to institute 
idioms which do not yet exist. (Lyotard 1988: 13) 
The pain of the Magistrate is not accompanied by silence. It is accompanied by 










which exceeds the bounds of recognisable, rational, and linguistically apprehensible 
language. The Magistrate's comfortable recourse to existing idioms, albeit 
incomprehensible to his captors, gives him some defence against their invasion of his 
position, rights, and identity - albeit an extralegal defence. When they torture him, 
they destroy his ability to speak or to keep quiet. But it stages the circumstance of the 
differend - the description of which is the last recourse of the potential victim. 
The difference between this "silence" and that of the barbarian girl - another 
victim of a differend - demonstrates Coetzee's interrogation of the differend. For the 
reader receives the description of the barbarian girl from the Magistrate's narrative. 
But the reader also receives the depiction ofthe Magistrate's legal marginality as a 
description within the Magistrate's narrative. By describing his differend, the 
Magistrate witnesses its undoing. His narrative voice empowers him at the very point 
that he is disempowered by his condition. 
Disgrace 
In Disgrace, David Lurie treats the inquiry into his relations with Melanie 
Isaacs with less seriousness than the Magistrate shows in his engagement with the 
Warrant Officer. 16 Lurie responds to his inquisitors with the declaration: "I plead 
guilty to both charges. Pass sentence, and let us get on with our lives." (Coetzee 2000: 
48) The committee that presides over Lurie's case does not answer this plea directly; 
rather it disavows its power to take decisions and, concomitantly, to admit a plea of 
guilt or innocence. Lurie shows an awareness of his relative helplessness before the 
discourse of courts and the law: '" I have no challenge in a legal sense,' he replies. 'I 
have reservations of a philosophical kind, but I suppose they are out of bounds." 
(Coetzee 2000: 47) Later he pleads a Socratic ignorance to the differences between "a 
trial" and "an inquiry", ofthe differences between "stating his position" and "entering 
a plea", in favour of distinguishing between "guilt" in the legal sense and "guilt" of "a 
philosophical kind". While Manas Mathabane, the chairman of the inquiry, responds 
to Lurie's philosophical reservations by suggesting "we had better restrict ourselves to 
the legal sense", the offense, Farodia Rassool observes, is moral rather than legal. 
"Professor Lurie pleads guilty, but I ask myself, does he accept his guilt or is he 
simply going through the motions in the hope that the case will be buried under paper 











want from me is not a response but a confession." Lurie proves capable of identifying 
the misrelated genres of the inquiry's narrative. Their designs are not legal, but moral. 
As their authority relies on legal standing, albeit in an advisory capacity, their 
recourse to accusations about the quality of Lurie's guilt displays an inconsistency 
between their authority as they present it and the authority they assume in the course 
of their inquisition. 
This inconsistency is most clearly observed in juxtaposing an early statement of 
the meeting, "This is a committee of inquiry ... It has no power to take decisions", 
with Rassool's verbal slip, 
'If he is censured. We fail to perform our duty if we are 
not crystal clear in our minds, and if we do not make it crystal 
clear in our recommendations, what Professor Lurie is being 
censured for.' (Coetzee 2000: 50) 
Despite Mathabane's correction, Rassool twice admits to censuring Lurie - the 
decision of a judge, rather than the recommendation of a committee. Lurie's 
observation of the disjuncture between the claims made by the committee and their 
linguistic practice has little practical consequence. Rassool, after demanding 
something more than "the motions", claims the committee should "take his plea at 
face value and recommend accordingly." (Coetzee 2000: 53) She then goes on to 
insist that the statement he makes "should come from him, in his own words. Then we 
can see ifit comes from his heart." (Coetzee 2000: 54) The "should" implies 
something more is required than following the letter of the law. For if the law is 
prescriptive then its discourse is made of "musts." "Shoulds", however, are not 
prescriptive. They imply an "ethical imperative", which indicates that they form part 
of a moral genre of discourse. (Coetzee 1992: 250) Lurie's response is to explicate his 
previous observations about the inconsistencies in this discourse: 
'I have said the words for you, now you want more, you 
want me to demonstrate their sincerity. That is preposterous. 
That is beyond the scope of the law. I have had enough. Let us 
go back to playing it by the book.' (Coetzee 2000: 55) 
As Lurie tells Mathabane during a later telephone conversation, he will not 











discourse." (Coetzee 2000: 58) Mathabane's response to this is, "You are not being 
instructed to repent." (Coetzee 2000: 58) Although the authorities desire "a spirit of 
repentance", they claim that there need be no concomitant "feeling". All that is 
required is a demonstration of sincerity. 
Lurie's confession, that he "became a servant of Eros", becomes, in this light, 
an attempt to navigate the warped discourse of the committee. The committee 
conflates notions of legal "guilt" and moral or ethical irresponsiveness. Lurie, by 
confessing to be a servant of Eros, engages the issue of moral turpitude, while his 
admission of legal "guilt" answers to their legal accusations. However, the conflation 
of discourse precludes the answering each to each individually. When he attempts to 
answer to the legal accusations, he is required to endorse his answer spiritually. When 
he responds to the spiritual accusations, he finds himself a subject of legality. The 
Law, therefore, in Disgrace becomes a murky morass of conflated and contradictory 
discourses: requiring a defence that simultaneously answers to both the legal and the 
moral implications of his actions. By refusing to endorse the "game" played according 
to the ever-shifting rules of the committee, Lurie maintains his ability to choose the 
manner of his response. Like the Magistrate, Lurie's recourse to a cultural milieu 
simultaneously makes him susceptible to legal statute and empowered beyond the 
scope of the law. His confession - "it is not a defence" - provides him with a moral 
escape from the matter, while retaining ethical responsibility. While they can institute 
a differend over his legal body by refusing to recognise his admissions and 
confessions, they fail to deprive him of his ability to choose the manner by which he 
admits and confesses. He, in this instance, retains his right to speak or to remain 
silent. 
Faced by his daughter Lucy, however, and faced by his attack and her rape, his 
recourse to language to describe the events seems inadequate. "He speaks Italian, he 
speaks French, but Italian and French will not save him here in darkest Africa." 
(Coetzee 2000: 95) The abuse of his body wrenches from him his ability to either 
speak or to remain silent. When his attackers cover him in methylated spirits, he 
undergoes a transformation that deprives him of the ability to articulate phrases 
beyond representations of his body's reaction to the pain. "He strikes at his face like a 
madman; his hair crackles as it catches alight; he throws himself about, hurling out 











After the fact, there seems to be little recourse to the law for Lurie. Lucy's 
decision, that "you tell what happened to you, I tell what happened to me", effectively 
prevents him from reporting the rape and finding some solace in retributive justice. 
(Coetzee 2000: 99) "In a voice that is fast descending to a croak", he accuses his 
daughter of making a mistake - but she refuses to endorse his assumption of power 
over their situation. 17 His bellows mimic those of the Magistrate; both are denied their 
subject positions and both are disallowed the relief of their usual linguistic acuity to 
make sense of their situations. 
Lurie's words in accusing his daughter are, "You are making a mistake." Lucy's 
response is, "You tell what happened to you ... " Later, when Lurie is haranguing Bev 
Shaw about Lucy's intransigence, he says, "I know what Lucy has been through. I 
was there." To which Bev responds, "But you weren't there, David. She told me. You 
weren't." Lurie is "baffled." 
Where, according to Bev Shaw, according to Lucy, was 
he not? In the room where the intruders were committing their 
outrages? Do they think he does not know what rape is? Do 
they think he has not suffered with his daughter? What more 
could he have witnessed than he is capable of imagining? Or 
do they think that where rape is concerned, no man can be 
where the woman is? Whatever the answer, he is outraged, 
outraged at being treated like an outsider. (Coetzee 2000: 140-
141) 
His questions, his distress, his feelings of marginality are indicative of a vain 
attempt to impose some sort of order on his situation and on his right to speak about 
his situation. Yet against this desire to regain his right to speak, to form in language 
the progression of events in the novel, stand those to whom his position as witness is 
compromised. By acting as witness to Lucy's rape, Lurie assumes an authority over 
the narrative of the situation. But, because his authority is undermined, because he 
"was not there", he is rendered impotent and speechless before the law. He cannot 
bear witness and so cannot be anything more than the victim - the plaintiff without 
any recourse to damages or phrases - of his circumstances. 
In Lyotard's treatment of Levinas in The Differend, he writes, "By turning the I 











hostage." (Lyotard 1988a: 111) Notwithstanding the ethical consequences of this 
phrase, it represents an important linguistic manner of conducting power relations. 
Lurie's conflict with Lucy stems from contrasting views as to who the 1 is in their 
relationship. "You" shifts from Lucy to Lurie during their interchange, just as the "I" 
of Lurie's conversation with Bev becomes a "You" as his position is undermined. 
Although 1 and you function as "shifters", without any fixed referent, their crucial 
difference occurs in their respective subject/object relation. 
The "I" and the "you", as linguistic referents, exist concurrently in the "here-
now" of the phrase that refers to their existence. Yet, insofar as the phrase describes 
the situation, the "I" retains authority over that description and, by extension, the 
situation. As opposed to an 1 that hostages itself to the you, "the 1 effaces the you." 
(Lyotard 1988a: 117) This echoes the linguistic significance Coetzee derives from 
Martin Buber's I and Thou. 18 Coetzee, as a linguist, turns Buber's spiritual writings 
into a linguistic strategy. So in response to Buber's evocation of the primary 
combination words "I-Thou" and "I-It", Coetzee makes the following observation, 
Then, immediately, we encounter curious features of the 
You. The You has little solidity to the gaze of the I. On the 
contrary, the You is absent; or is present only passively, as an 
object of the awareness of the I; or is capable only of an 
inactive locativity defined in relation to the 1. In other words, 
the You is absent or evanescent or dependent on the I; and the 
relation of I to You, being barely transitive, cannot be 
reciprocal. (Coetzee 1992: 72) 
While the "Achterberg" essay from which this is drawn was first published in 
1977, twenty two years before Disgrace, Coetzee's observation of the linguistic 
ramifications of using" You" still hold. By imposing a "You" on his daughter, Lurie 
makes her "dependent on [his] I", which prevents reciprocity in "the relation of [his] I 
to [her] you." His language turns her from a sufferer of a wrong, with the ability to 
either speak or keep silent about that wrong, into a victim whose voice he would 
assume if he were to champion her cause. 
Bev Shaw implements a similar linguistic strategy when she reiterates his 
sentence using the second person. Admittedly Bev is not entirely fair in her refutation: 











position of authority in bearing witness to both his attack and Lucy's. He was not in 
the room; he cannot imagine the offence. Lurie brings to bear, in negotiating the 
trauma of his experience, the full weight of Romantic precedent, "the sympathetic 
imagination." "There is no limit to the extent to which we can think our way into the 
being of another. There are no bounds to the sympathetic imagination." 19 So says 
Elizabeth Costello in "The Lives of Animals: The Philosophers and the Animals." 
However, as Sam Durrant has persuasively argued, in Lurie's case inter alia there 
exist "limits to his capacity to think his way into other lives.,,2o Durrant cites Lurie's 
imaginative attempt at re-enacting Lucy's rape: 
You don't understand, you weren't there, says Bev 
Shaw. Well, she is mistaken. Lucy's intuition is right after all: 
he does understand; he can, if he concentrates, if he loses 
himself, be there, be the men, inhabit them, fill them with the 
ghost of himself. The question is, does he have it in him to be 
the woman?" (Coetzee 2000: 160) 
At best Lurie can assume the role of offender. Even as he is outraged by Bev's 
linguistic marginalisation of his subject position, he refuses to, or cannot, marginalise 
that subject position himself. However, in order to assume the role of victim, he must 
effectively elide his own voice. 
The double-bind ofthe victim, as expressed by Lyotard, is such that, 
Either you are a victim of a wrong, or you are not. If you 
are not, you are deceived (or lying) in testifying that you are. 
If you are, since you can bear witness to this wrong, it is not a 
wrong, and you are deceived (or lying) in testifying that you 
are the victim of a wrong. (Lyotard 1988a: 5) 
In testifying to victimhood, there exists some recourse to a tribunal to whom 
one may testify. Victims, however, by definition, have no recourse to such a tribunal. 
Lurie, in attempting to bear witness to a situation at which only Lucy and her rapists 
were present, encounters the problem of claiming a position of authority, albeit 
narrative authority, over a situation at which he has not been present. Yet, rather than 
attempt to testify to the circumstances of his own attack, as Lucy suggests with her 











humiliation, his own disgrace. Lucy's eventual response, eschewing his claims at 
paternal authority in her letter to him, calls him "one of the three chimpanzees, the 
one with his paws over his eyes." (Coetzee 2000: 161) Before his daughter, Lurie 
stands blind to his own position as victim, subject to his own differend, the 
heterogeneity of his situation and his discursive attempts to make sense of it. 
Again, however, it is the narrative positioning of the text, by which the situation 
is observed, that undermines the sufferance of a differend. Lurie, though unable to 
articulate it, is able to show the situation of his status as victim. Without collapsing 
into the prescriptive trap of genre, Lurie retains the status of both witness and victim, 
by virtue of the authorial presence.21 
Elizabeth Costello 
"At the Gate", Elizabeth Costello's final Lesson, re-enacts a Kafka parable 
significantly called "Before the Law.,,22 Kafka's tale concerns the repeated efforts of 
his narrator to enter "the gate" through which he must pass in order to reach "the 
Law." Like many of Kafka's tales, the parable restricts its reader to the 
incomprehension of its narrator. The purpose of passing through the gate remains 
shrouded in mystery for the narrator and the reader. The conclusion is unsatisfying: 
with the narrator's death, the gate ceases to have purpose and thus ceases to be. The 
law, or the Law, remains undefined and inaccessible. Although the man could enter, 
the doorkeeper recommends against it. And, while the man thinks "the Law ... should 
surely be accessible at all times and to everyone", the doorkeeper is so threatening, 
the man "decides that it is better to wait until he gets permission to enter." (Kafka 
200: 3) The prescriptive power of the law, though it remains undefined, denies its 
subjects the right to witness its identity or question its nature. The man at the gate, 
deprived of his right to question the Law to which he is subject, suffers as the victim 
of a differend. 
When Elizabeth arrives "at the gate", she is required to make a statement of 
belief. This statement of belief and the inquiry that follows are all that is required to 
open the gate. Kafka's gate also requires a statement of belief: a belief as to that 
which lies beyond the gate. Giving that statement will open the gate for, in a manner 
of speaking, that which keeps the gate beyond the protagonist's reach are their 











conceptual structures. Yet, in both cases, the guardians who prevent the respective 
protagonists from accessing the gate also test whether they are deemed worthy of 
access. Against the tests, neither the narrator nor Costello is equipped to defend the 
subject position that they hold. 
In this, both the Kafka piece and Coetzee' s reworking of it, resonate with 
Kafka's The Tria/.23 Joseph K, the more articulate antecedent of Michael K, wakes up 
to the occasion of his arrest "one fine morning." (Kafka 2005: 7) When he attempts to 
give his identity documents to his warders, in a bid to make sense of an arrest for 
which he has apparently committed no crime to deserve, they respond, "What are 
your papers to us?" 
'Our officials ... , as the Law decrees, are drawn towards 
the guilty and must send out us warders. That is the Law. How 
can there be a mistake in that?' 'I don't know this Law,' said 
K. 'All the worse for you,' replied the warder. . And it 
probably exists nowhere but in your own head,' said K. 
(Kafka 2005: 12) 
The other warder, coincidentally named Franz, then observes a discrepancy 
between Josers plea of innocence and his ignorance of "this Law." As the novel 
continues, for it cannot be said to progress, K loses the confidence of his initial 
outrage and gradually becomes immersed in the seriousness of his "trial", without 
ever understanding the reason for its occurrence. His early claim that the Law exists 
"nowhere but in your own head" is apposite to his situation. His growing worry about 
the trial stems from the insistence of the tribunal on the seriousness of the charge 
without ever explaining or revealing the actuality of the charge. As such, his worry is 
an endorsement of the tribunal's authority; he worries as a result of their call for him 
to worry. 
Coetzee's characters resist the urge to endorse their respective tribunals in the 
way of JosefK. However, perhaps because of their historical circumstances-
Apartheid, State of Emergency, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission: extra-legal 
bodies that, by their legal endorsement, are subject to those problems with the law that 
this chapter raises - the tribunals they face have a power over the body that belies 











If one associates Costello's appeal to "embodiedness" in "The Lives of 
Animals" and "Realism" with Coetzee's position in "The Jerusalem Prize Acceptance 
Speech", there seems little possibility of relegating the effects of the law to the 
content of one's own head. 
Realism has never been comfortable with ideas. It could 
not have been otherwise: realism is premised on the idea that 
ideas have no autonomous existence, can only exist in 
things ... The notion of embodying turns out to be pivotal. In 
such debates ideas do not and indeed cannot float free: they 
are tied to the speakers by whom they are ensconced. (Coetzee 
2004b: 9) 
When the recourse to the abstract - for so may be interpreted both the 
Magistrate and Lurie's appeal to culture - fails for Coetzee's dominant characters, 
they also become "animal." 
The animal, according to Lyotard, "is a paradigm of the victim." 
Some feel more grief over damages inflicted upon an 
animal than over those inflicted upon a human. This is 
because the animal is deprived of the possibility of bearing 
witness according to the human rules for establishing 
damages, and as a consequence, every damage is like a wrong 
and turns it into a victim ipso facto. - But, if it does not at all 
have the means to bear witness then there are not even 
damages, or at least you cannot establish them. - What you 
are saying defines exactly what I mean by a wrong; you place 
the defender of the animal before a dilemma. (Lyotard 1988a: 
28) 
Given the victimhood of the animal, it is interesting to note that the most 
significant correspondence between David Lurie and the Magistrate is their mutual 
status as "dog-men." (Coetzee 2000: 146) The repeated simile of the Magistrate is 
"like a dog." "There is no way of dying allowed me, it seems, except like a dog in a 
comer." (Coetzee 2004: 128) "I bolted my food down like a dog", he says to Mai the 











though he resents Lucy's decision to live "like a dog" in starting "from ground level." 
(Coetzee 2000: 205) Yet though, as Lurie observes, it is "legally ... not workable" for 
Lucy to retain rights if she gives up her land, Lurie's own experience of the law has 
relegated him to a marginal position - a position where his marginal state precludes 
him from defence against even that which is ostensibly illegal- and the use of the 
simile, "like a dog", is merely Lucy's reiteration of Lurie's description of Lucy's 
proposed situation. 
Durrant calls the simile in this instance a mark of "resemblance" but also the 
recognition of "a certain limit: one can imitate the life of a dog but never actually lead 
a dog's life." (Durrant 2006: 131) Lurie applies the simile, "like a dog", to the 
situation of starting "at ground level"; that which Lucy describes as, "With nothing. 
Not with nothing but. With nothing. No cards, no weapons, no property, no rights, no 
dignity." (Coetzee 2000: 205) Yet, while she will have "no things", she will not have 
"nothing", absence, loss. For by surrendering herself to what the Magistrate calls "the 
irruption of history into the static time of the oasis", by becoming peasant, by 
becoming animal, Lucy hopes to survive beneath the event of history and historical 
narrative. (Coetzee 2004a: 157) 
Elizabeth Costello, confronted by a literal gate representing the figurative 
boundaries of her sympathetic imagination, allows herself nonetheless a vision of 
what lies beyond "the gate, the side she is denied." 
At the foot of the gate, blocking the way lies stretched 
out a dog, an old dog, his lion-coloured hide scarred from 
innumerable manglings. His eyes are closed, he is resting, 
snoozing. Beyond him is nothing but a desert of sand and 
stone, to infinity. It is her first vision in a long while, and she 
does not trust it, does not trust in particular the anagram GOD-
DOG. Too literary, she thinks again. A curse on literature! 
(Coetzee 2004b: 224-225) 
Costello's criticism of her own vision as "too literary" stems from its reliance 
on word associations: GOD inverted becomes an old DOG. Moreover the desert 
stretching to "infinity" is too reminiscent of Wheatley's nonsensical analogy of 
infinity to notions of the "best writer" in her first lesson, "Realism": "Without infinity 











just a construct, a human construct." (Coetzee 2004b: 8) Yet the dog guarding the gate 
in some ways prevents her from imagining anything that is not, like infinity, a human 
construct. Its presence subverts her rule over the possibilities of her imagination. 
Moreover, like the doorkeeper of Kafka's parable, it endorses the rule oflaw that 
prohibits her entry. 
The limits of authority that Durrant invokes, therefore, become limits to the 
potential for a victim, who has "become animal", to respond to his or her continual 
existence within history. For, although their recourse is to this primal state, Lurie, 
Lucy, the Magistrate, all face the inevitability of history and before that "Law" their 
animal states impose on them the status of victims - it is only their presence within 
their respective texts that vocalises their suffering and enables an escape from the 
differend. 
The inversion of the tasks expected on one side and on 
the other may suffice to transform the accused into a victim, if 
he or she does not have the right to criticize the prosecution, 
as we see in political trials. Kafka warned us about this. It is 
impossible to establish one's innocence, in and of itself. It is a 
nothingness. (Lyotard 1988a: 9) 
The differend may occur in trials where the accused may not respond to his or 
her accusers. Literature, however, provides the means to describe the trial from the 
perspective of the accused. While it remains impossible to establish one's innocence, 
in and of itself, the narrative in which innocence is described provides the means for 
subverting the differend that the impossibility represents. The differend does not 
restrict itself to situations; it also infringes the discourse of its victims and the genre 
this discourse takes. 
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Chapter Two: Taking Care in Age of Iron and Slow Man 
At the heart of the unfreedom of the hereditary masters of South Africa is a 
failure of Love. 
J. M. Coetzee "Jerusalem Prize Acceptance Speech" 
This chapter examines reciprocity in acts of generosity and charity. Age of Iron 
and Slow Man concern themselves with the care for others and the consequences of 
caring for others. The term "take care", as it occurs in Coetzee's works, is ambivalent 
in its signification: it is as often indicative of violence as it is of comfort or solicitude. 
Examining the ambivalence of the term leads to the realization that even solicitous 
"care-taking" imposes a kind of violence on the cared-for. In establishing an "ethic of 
gratitude" in the act of care, the agency that care-taker takes from the cared-for is 
reinstated in another manifestation ofCoetzee's poetics of reciprocity. An "ethic of 
gratitude" is the phrase developed specifically to examine the ethic that involves the 
giver of a gift acknowledging the right of the recipient to respond to the gift. The gift 
is given with a corresponding acknowledgment that the recipient may accept or reject 
the gift, but most importantly that he or she may engage with the gift giving process 
as more than merely the passive "you" of the interaction. 
An "ethic of gratitude" does not prescribe gratitude as the response to charity or 
gifts; it is the additional obligation on the gift-giver to allow the gift's recipient to 
respond. It is the surrender of the "I" subject position to the "You" not in order for the 
addressor to become the hostage of the "You" but to create a reciprocal admission that 
an exchange has taken place. 
The absence of an "ethic of gratitude", when a gift is given "without the 
possibility of return", creates a differend for the voiceless recipient of the gift. This 
chapter relates the linguistic discussions of the Introduction with the issues of speech 
rights raised in Chapter One by examining the consequences of this non-legal 
differend on those recipients whose right to speak is specifically undermined by 












When, in J. M. Coetzee's Disgrace, David Lurie returns to take care of his 
daughter on her farm he asks whether she will "take care" of her nascent foetus. 1 
Lucy, Lurie's daughter, is the victim of a terrible rape, and is bearing a child "from 
that day." She responds to Lurie's accusation of failing to care, 
I have taken care. I have taken every reasonable care 
short of what you are hinting at. But I am not having an 
abortion. That is something I am not prepared to go through 
again. (Coetzee 2000: 198) 
Lucy objects to the "care" that will visit upon her the further violation of an 
abortion on her body. However, she acknowledges that she will take "care" of the 
child; she deliberately misinterprets David's euphemism to be a literal demand that 
she provide care: by nurturing it in her womb and protecting it in the manner that 
David would protect her. The word "care" becomes ambiguous, connoting a position 
simultaneously violent and comforting. Lurie's own desire to take care of Lucy, by 
having her abort her child, turns the comforting solicitude he wishes to show her into 
an act of violence. 
To reiterate, Jean-Fran<;ios Lyotard calls the differend, "the unstable state and 
instant of language wherein something which must be able to be put into phrases 
cannot yet be.,,2 "What is at stake," Lyotard writes, "in a literature, in a philosophy, in 
a politics perhaps, is to bear witness to differends by finding idioms for them." 
(Lyotard 1988: 13) Bearing witness to differends, as this example from Disgrace 
demonstrates, requires the clarification of terms. Lucy observes the differing uses of 
the word care in Lurie's discourse by bearing witness to its conflation. While she may 
"take care", she refuses to acknowledge an abortion as part of that process. 
This ambivalence to the nature of "care" is a concern by no means exclusive to 
Disgrace. Coetzee's work, as oeuvre, concerns itself with the treatment of others, not 
simply as victims deprived of their voices, but as sufferers of the solicitude of others. 
This chapter examines the treatment of care in Age of Iron3, Slow Man4, his most 
recent novel, and the most recent appearance of Elizabeth Costello prior to Slow Man, 











Care, whether given or taken, is offered in Coetzee's novels as means of 
providing for another what they cannot or will not provide themselves. It may be a 
comforting gesture, a charitable action, or an act of violence. Yet, in each case, 
"taking care" empowers the care-taker and disempowers the cared-for. As the cared-
for does not provide for him- or herself what the care-taker provides them, the cared-
for becomes obliged to the care-taker. By articulating this obligation, one at least 
bears witness to its presence. In bearing witness to the presence of obligation, one 
acknowledges the need for an "ethic of gratitude" to take its place. 
Mrs Curren, in Age of Iron, is shaken when the homeless man, Vercueil, spits 
on the ground in front of her. This follows Mrs Curren's offer of "a job of work" and 
her subsequent diatribe, "You are wasting your life", when he fails to respond. 
(Coetzee 1998: 18) Mrs Curren interprets this "word" "from a language before 
language" as "Here: take your coffee." (Coetzee 1998: 18) The implication is that the 
coffee and the job offer do not justify Mrs Curren's claim: "You are wasting your 
life." She assumes the right to make the claim because of her apparently charitable 
action, and is shocked when V ercueil refuses to acknowledge her power over him or 
his obligation to her. 
Lyotard, in dealing with Levinas's views on obligation and the other, identifies 
the work of the latter as coming to the following, implicit, conclusion: "Obligation 
alienates the ego: it becomes the you of an absolutely unknowable other." (Lyotard 
1988: 115) Lyotard's particularly linguistic approach in The DifJerend provides the 
means for explicating this phrase. For, rather than being the "I" or active subject 
position implicit in the ego, the ego in question, according to Levinas's obligatory 
surrender before and toward the other, must, in Lyotard's linguistic revision of 
Levinas, lose the power of their primary subject position, within the phrase, and 
assume the status of the you - the passive subject position of a sentence. Becoming a 
"you" limits the power of the person within the context of the phrase, as they are 
denied recourse to the enunciating power of the "I." 
Lyotard extends his critique of Levinas and obligation in the essay, "Levinas' 
logic. ,,6 
The expression Obey! seems then to cover several of the 
properties that Levinas attributes to the ethical situation. It is 











with an instruction to make it executable ... It is not 
executable, but it is that which renders executory. 
So it is not understood in the sense of being 
comprehended, but only in the sense of being received [as an 
obligation]. However it is never in fact received in its own 
right but merely hidden in the form of complete or 'full' 
prescriptive statements, that is, instructives ... According to 
Levinas, 'it' is not obligatory because 'it' is universal; 'it' is 
simply obligatory. In this way, the Lord requires of Israel not 
obedience but rather obligation towards Him, before he 
instructs the people as to what they will be obliged to do. 
(Lyotard 1989: 307-308) 
Lyotard articulates Levinas's principle of alterity as "That I Thou I shalt never 
be I I I!" (Lyotard 1989: 304) The statement is prescriptive: it requires that addressee 
to Obey! But, like the command Obey, the principle can only be understood "in the 
sense of received", not "in the sense of being comprehended." For, in order for the 
addressee to articulate comprehension, he or she must adopt the position of the 
enunciating I, disobeying the command "never [to] be I." 
To find oneself placed in the pragmatic position of being 
obliged is incommensurable with the position of enunciation, 
even of enunciating prescriptives. The incommensurability is 
the same as that of freedom with the condition of being a 
hostage. (Lyotard 1989: 308) 
The freedom that comes with enunciating prescriptives carries for the addressee 
the position of being obliged. Mrs Curren's unexplained shock at V ercueil' s response 
is a shock at his refusal to be obliged. His spit is raised to the level of enunciation in 
its explicit rejection of his obligation. The shock demonstrates an expectation on Mrs 
Curren's part of gratitude in return for the gift. The problem lies in her refusal to 
acknowledge V ercueil' s freedom to express his response to the gift. The unspoken 
prescriptive laid on Vercueil with the gift is that he makes "no fires" and "no mess", 
listens to her harangues about getting ajob, and attends to her accusation that he 











express a response to her charity, she takes his obligation for granted and assumes an 
authority over his life to which he can only respond with silence and spit. 
Ironically, it is in her attempts to limit the "charity" of her actions, that she 
becomes more "caring." After his half-hearted attempts at gardening she pays him, 
saying: "I know you are not a gardener. .. and I do not want to turn you into what you 
are not. But we can't proceed on a basis of charity." (Coetzee 1998: 21) When he asks 
why, she answers: "Because you don't deserve it." His response, "Deserve ... Who 
deserves anything?" is met by anger: she thrusts her purse at him while demanding, 
"What do you believe in, then? Taking? Taking what you want? Go on: take!" 
(Coetzee 1998: 21) Charity is revealed as something that must be earned, for which 
one must be worthy. Vercueil, Mrs Curren decides, is not worthy. When he questions 
her decision, she responds irrationally, assuming that he conforms to another 
stereotype: the thieving indigent. However, by paying him for his service, Mrs Curren 
does acknowledge a problem inherent in charity: reciprocal relationships are 
impossible in situations where the economy of exchange, set up by an act of giving, 
does not provide the recipient the means to complete the exchange. Coetzee addresses 
the problem by setting up what I have called an "ethic of gratitude": the part of a giver 
in acknowledging the right of a recipient to respond to a gift or gesture. 
When Mrs Curren proposes sending her "letter" to her daughter after her death 
"as a gift without the possibility of return", the daughter, the "you" of the letter, is 
denied the possibility to respond, is denied the right to enunciate her response by the 
chains that her semantic positioning as "you" within the text places upon her: despite 
the rhetoric of "you in me" Mrs Curren uses. By not allowing her daughter to respond 
to her, Mrs Curren precipitates an exchange to which the daughter will be indebted 
without recourse to a return. The relationship, such as it is, becomes, with the writing 
of the text, asymmetrical. The daughter is obligated without the means to reciprocate 
or to respond; the relationship between mother and daughter cannot function within an 
"ethic of gratitude" as the daughter is denied the right to respond to the gift with or 
without gratitude. 
Obligation ties itself to the dilemma of the differend: the obligation one imposes 
through caring forces the cared-for into a state where any response constitutes a 
rebuttal of the obligation. If one attempts, as the cared-for, to "return the favour", he 
or she assumes an enunciative freedom in articulating how the obligation may be 











without being executable, of its ambivalence. It also strips the care-taker of his or her 
enunciative power over the cared-for - the cared-for may discharge the obligation of 
being cared-for. 
The act of care-taking, the irony of care-taking, lies first and foremost in its 
lexical constituents. For by "taking care", one either means "being careful" or "being 
caring, solicitous, and helpful towards somebody else." But, of course, one is "taking" 
care; the care-taker also obtains something without necessarily being given it. Unless 
it is self-solicitation, that which the caretaker receives is probably not "care." Rather, 
as a hypothesis, it is the subject position "I" over the "you" of the cared-for, who is 
obligated by the care given to grant the care-giver the semantic power of the phrase: 
"I take care of you." 
Moreover the terms "give" and "take", usually antonymic, become synonymous 
in references to either the "care-giver" or the "care-taker." It seems appropriate at this 
point to examine the ambiguities set up by seeing "care" as a gift simultaneously 
"given" and "taken". 
When Mrs Curren, in Age of Iron, condescends to give Vercueil food, though he 
does not ask for it, she seeks to set up an emotional economy of exchange between 
them: she has an expectation that Vercueil will be obliged. The food ceases, therefore, 
to be something freely given; Mrs Curren expects to be able to "take" obligation in 
return. However, when Vercueil throws her sandwich away and spits out her coffee, 
he reveals the fallacy of calling such charity a gift; the reader is encouraged to be as 
shocked as Mrs Curren by the violence of his refusal, thereby exposing his or her own 
assumptions about obligation. 
Charity, as Mrs Curren notes, comes from the Latin, caritas: care. However, her 
first claim is that caritas means heart. "A lie: charity, caritas, has nothing to do with 
the heart." (Coetzee 1998: 20) While Mrs Curren tells Vercueil that charity comes 
from the Latin word for the heart, she confesses in the letter she writes to her daughter 
that she has lied about the etymology. While caritas does come from the root carus 
which means "dear", similar to the heart, the actual etymology has little significance 
to her sermon to Vercueil. Carrol Clarkson, in "Responses to Spaces and Space of 
Response in J. M. Coetzee", argues that the fictional etymology plays an important 












The fact that Mrs Curren's ethical view draws on a 
"poetic principle" (the fictive association of caritas and 
"heart") rather than on "the certainties of didactic 
discourse" ... does not, in itself, make her view any less valid. 
(Clarkson 2006: 10) 
U sing terminology borrowed from the artist, Robert Smithson, Clarkson stresses 
the contingencies brought about by thc poetic construction because, as she quotes 
from Smithson, under scrutiny the word opens up into a series of faults: "the 
certainties of didactic discourse are hurled into the erosion of the poetic principle." 
(Smithson quoted in Clarkson 2006: 1) Mrs Curren's etymological discussions have 
no intrinsic significance. Rather, their relevance devolves from the associations, 
poetic or factual, she chooses to make. Of course, the difference between telling 
someone that charity comes from the heart and admitting privately that it is a false 
etymology, reveals more than an ethical desire to bring the heart into acts of charity 
and care. Vercueil's "obligation", should he accept Mrs Curren's charity, must 
acknowledge there is a feeling behind her gesture, akin to, if not synonymous with, 
love. With her "sermons of false etymologies", Mrs Curren creates associations 
between care, charity, and love. But, despite her confession, she resents Vercueil's 
refusal to accede to her etymological constructs. "No charity in him, no forgiveness. 
(Charity? Says Vercueil. Forgiveness?) Without his forgiveness I give without 
charity, serve without love." (Coetzee 1998: 131) Mrs Curren expects Vercueil to 
respond to her charity. He, however, refuses to acknowledge the obligation she sets 
upon him through her use of false etymologies and references to love. 
When Elizabeth Costello fellates Mr Phillips in Coetzee's eponymous novel, 
she distinguishes agape from caritas, suggesting the latter is a specifically Christian 
conception of care while the former is closer to eros. 8 However, the ostensible 
opposition of agape to caritas that Costello suggests may be collapsed by considering 
agape a disinterested, unreciprocable, love-charity. Moreover, this explains the 
caritas involved in Mrs Curren writing a letter to an absent daughter who will be 
unable to respond9; it is a caring with a love that may not be reciprocated. 
This caritas, care, stems from her desire not to inflict on her daughter the pain 
of her dying; she resists to "the craving to share [her] death." (Coetzee 1998: 5) But it 











the true meaning of the embrace. We embrace to be embraced." (Coetzee 1998: 5) 
She refuses the absent daughter any embrace because she fears inflicting 
responsibility on that daughter. But she simultaneously denies her daughter the right 
herself to be embraced. The "care" in the letter becomes a violence of the letter; 
"care" itself becomes conflated with violence. 
Agape may be defined as "gift-love". But, as has already been demonstrated, 
this "gift-love" conflates with the idea of charity as a care given without thought of 
return. The "Gift", a gerund associate of "giving", therefore defines the event of care-
giving; the cared-for receives the care, ifit is given with caritas or charity, like a gift. 
A discussion of care in Coetzee - especially in Age oj Iron - must take into account 
that the care Mrs. Curren takes of her daughter forms itself as a gift: the gift of the 
letter. Derek Attridge, in his chapter on Age oj Iron, argues for precisely the 
significance of the letter as a gift in demonstrating the care with which Mrs. Curren 
relieves her daughter of the responsibility of responding. ] 0 
Attridge's concept of the gift]], something that is given without thought of 
return, attempts to avoid the "discourse of knowledge as content and inheritable 
property." (Attridge 2005: 92) Rather "understanding it" should remain "an always 
contextualized responsiveness, activity, and self-questioning." The "gift" is empty of 
substance; it has meaning only in the obligation it carries to its recipient. That it is 
given without thought of return indicts the giver. For "without thought of return" 
carries with its altruistic idealism the ignorance of the inevitable obligation its 
function as a prescriptive command carries. 
The gift in Age oj Iron is Age oj Iron; a letter "given" to its fictional "you" and 
to its readers. But, more than that, it is the act of giving that occurs in the event of 
reading that Attridge argues is the gift - more than the letter that merely "represents" 
the gift-as-act. (Attridge 2005: 92-93) Yet the irony of invoking absolute alterity, 
either ofVercueil as messenger or Mrs Curren's unnamed daughter, denies the 
responsibility and responsiveness that Attridge's "ethical understanding" requires. 
They are, each of them, denied the means to relieve the obligation that their status as 
recipients invokes. 
That Mrs Curren chooses not to be a burden on her daughter, exile or migrant, is 
commendable; that she sends "a letter" as a "gift" "without thought of return" is 
questionable. For her decision to share her death with her daughter after the fact 











the act of reading. Though the daughter will retain her authority over the text as its 
reader, Mrs Curren's demand on her, by invoking her in the position of the "you", 
pre-empts her ability to respond with the monologism of her own worries and cares. 
Her final act of solicitude figures itself as an assertion of parental authority over her 
departed daughter. Her "gift" takes the form of a prescriptive command that is never 
fully articulated - it is the implicit demand to bear witness to her experiences that is, 
to rewrite Attridge's phrase, "an obligation without thought of return." 
The gift, as an act or event, takes the form of care-taking - for the feelings, 
emotions, and actions of the daughter. In this care-taking, however, it enacts precisely 
the ambiguity, "ambivalence" to use Elizabeth Costello's term, which is concomitant 
with the caring process. Mrs Curren denies her daughter the space to reciprocate; she 
denies her the possibility of gratitude. 
Mrs Curren requests Vercueil take the package of her writings, the 
representation of her gift to her daughter, to the post office, a request "so little that it 
is almost nothing. Between taking the package and not taking it the difference is as 
light as a feather." She does not see the irony of her next line, that "if there is the 
slightest breath of trust, obligation, piety left behind when I am gone, he will surely 
take it." (Coetzee 1998: 130) Vercueil, a homeless man without responsibilities, must 
accord with the wishes of a dying woman, must constrain himself with the obligation 
she places on him by virtue of nothing less than her position as helpless and marginal. 
For ifher acts of charity are to retain their worth it cannot be from the gratitude of 
these that he does her bidding; though it is this that probably engenders the word 
"obligation." Certainly the word "piety" resonates with her quasi-religious notion of 
caritas. The trace of herself implicit in the "breath of trust" - it is, after all, her trust in 
him that she believes should in part oblige him to act - functions as the cause for him 
to accede to her demands. For, despite the end of obligation that should accompany 
her death, she asks for the commission of the task when she is alive and can anticipate 
the occurrence of her death. But, because the reader is sympathetic to her situation, 
her call on Vercueil to accede to her demands, against her own diagnosis that he is 
without charity, seems groundless. The reader, precisely because of his or her 
sympathy, cannot sympathise with that basis of obligation. 
Any gift actually given brings about an emotional exchange. So the true "gift" is 
not so much an object as an event that is always coming into being without ever 











simultaneous inception and negation. As soon as one gives a gift, creating the 
situation of giving, one automatically creates an economy of exchange that 
undermines any thinking of the gift as a gift. 
Jacques Derrida considers the possibility of resolving the dilemma of giving by 
appealing to a secret in The Gift of Death. If I give the food without calling it a gift, it 
falls outside the emotional economy of exchange. It then becomes "the gift that is not 
a present ... of something that remains inaccessible, unpresentable, and as a 
consequence secret", rather than "a gift that could be recognized as such ... a gift 
destined for recognition", which would "immediately annul itself.,,12 The only manner 
in which such a non-gift could be made without necessitating a more pecuniary 
economy of exchange would be through some act of giving that occurs from one who 
sees without being seen. 13 This religious conception of giving is, of course, charity. 
However recourse to "the secret" does not undermine the prescription, Give!, which 
the gift-as-act carries. Concomitantly, charity and care carry the obligations of the 
prescriptive command. 
Age of Iron 
Age of Iron is ostensibly a letter, and "so long a letter" (Coetzee 1998: 118) 
written by a dying classics professor from her Mill Street home in Cape Town to her 
daughter living in the United States. As the novel progresses, however, it is 
increasingly clear that even as it provides a description of the woman, Mrs. Curren, 
and her final weeks of life, it also becomes an act of confession; an attempt by Mrs. 
Curren to achieve some sort of grace. Mrs. Curren's response to the rhetorical 
question: "To whom this writing then? ... to you but not to you; to me: to you in me" 
(Coetzee 1998: 5) suggests though her writing is for her daughter, it is also for her 
own soul-searching and, concomitantly, soul-cleansing vis-a.-vis the absolution 
brought about by confession. 
The novel begins with the arrival of Vercueil, a homeless man accompanied by 
the ever significant Coetzeean dog. Vercueil arrives on the same day that Mrs. Curren 
is told she is dying of cancer, a day before she begins to write her letter. 14 Initially she 
resists ascribing significance to this coincidence of events: "[He is] not an angel, 
certainly." (Coetzee 1998: 12) However, she becomes embroiled in the political 











convey her sense of charity to Vercueil, are taken from languages not only foreign to 
the land in which she lives, but incongruent with the times in which she must take a 
part. The care that she understands is a care "from long ago and far away" - the 
Christian care of Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and C.S. Lewis. It is a solipsistic care 
that acknowledges no return and hinges its authenticity on refusing return. 
Unlike her treatment of her cats, her treatment of her daughter denies the 
daughter's right to respond to her care and generosity. The genre of a letter 
presupposes a recipient. But Attridge has argued that Age of Iron, in its direction at an 
absent extra-textual other, makes this task of communication impossible. It "makes 
possible for Mrs Curren an exceptional fullness of giving ... in that it enables the gift 
[of the letter] to be posthumous, without thought of return." (Attridge 2005: 93) The 
solipsistic genre that characterises Age of Iron similarly characterises the selfish 
selflessness of denying the other voice in the cycle of care and (in)gratitude. This 
denial violates the ethic that exists between the giver and the receiver. By refusing her 
daughter the right to reply to her need, Mrs Curren expresses, through her love, a lack 
of care about her daughter's right to choose or respond to the 'gift' she will be given. 
Slow Man 
Slow Man also explores a further connotation of the word "care." A retired 
photographer, Paul Rayment, is hit by a car while riding his bike. As a consequence, 
he loses his leg and must employ a nurse to take care of him. After Paul dismisses his 
first nurse, Sheena, she is replaced by a Croatian woman, Marijana Jokic. During the 
course of her care-giving, Paul falls in love with her. Her response is to become 
increasingly distant and lax in the fulfilment of her duties. Enter Elizabeth Costello 
who problematises both novel and situation with her metatextual commentary on the 
story and her insistence on Paul's responsibility to the Jokic family. Paul, at this point, 
wishes to pay for the tuition of the Jokic's son, Drago, at an expensive military 
academy as a response both to the care Marijana has given him and the love that he 
bears for her. The Jokics, however, are particularly resistant to this return of care. 
When Paul first loses his leg, a nurse tells him that "everything is taken care of." 
(Coetzee 2005: 4) Again, this notion of care is ambiguous: although the leg has yet to 
be taken care of, by being removed, this may well be the nurse's referent. But, as is 











servant's son, Bheki, and Bheki's friend, John. As she approaches the private moment 
of her death she finds herself exposed to the loss of privacy correspondent with living 
during the South African State of Emergency. As a policeman says in response to her 
outrage at the invasion of her privacy: "Nothing is private anymore." (Coetzee 1998: 
157) In the face of this intrusion, all Mrs. Curren can do is try to achieve some 
measure of grace, through her confession and through her actions. But because "the 
spirit of charity has perished in this country" (Coetzee 1998: 19), and because there 
already exists for her too great a debt to pay back,15 it is only to the animals of Age of 
Iron, and to Vercueil, the man who is simultaneously both an "old tom" and a "dog" 
that she can give without entering into an "economy of exchange." (Coetzee 1998: 44; 
42) 
Last instructions, never enforceable. For the dead are not 
persons. That is the law: all contracts lapse. The dead cannot 
be cheated, cannot be betrayed, unless you carry them with 
you in your heart and do the crime there. (Coetzee 1998: 32) 
Mrs. Curren claims she "must love, first of all, the unlovable" and the unloving. 
(Coetzee 1998: 136) But while she announces that principle about Bheki's friend, 
John, she cannot give him love that isn't affected by an economy of exchange. As the 
dogs, and even Vercueil in his capacity as a "dog-man" who protects and cares for 
her, cannot but respond to her love by protecting her and loving her, she seems denied 
the opportunity to find grace through charitable action; through loving the unlovable. 
Mrs. Curren in her charitable treatment of her cats gives them love without 
expectation of return. In a country where love seems dead, it is perhaps the most 
significant act someone can do. It is made more poignant by her complete ignorance 
that it is through the act of feeding her cats, that she achieves the grace that she so 
desires and that is denied to her conscious confessions, her overt charities. The irony 
that her cats do not respond to her "duty" with affection serves to exaggerate their 
right to respond freely to her treatment: in this, she enters into the obligation of 
feeding them with an "ethic of gratitude." 
As Coetzee says in an interview with David Attwell, while "Elizabeth Curren 
brings to bear against the voices of history and historical judgment... the authority of 
the classics", this effort "is derided and denied because they speak from long ago and 











possessions, his integrity, and his personal safety: "everything is safe." (Coetzee 
2005: 4) This ambiguity exists throughout the use of "care" in the hospital discourse. 
For Dr Hansen l6 to take care of the leg (remove it), Paul must be doubly violated: 
"First the violation, then consent to the violation." (Coetzee 2005: 8). Following the 
removal of the leg there is a discussion about "care of the leg" (nursing it). Paul 
realizes the inconsistencies in this use of the word "care". 
Care of my leg? He is smouldering with anger - can 
they not see it? You anaethetised me and hacked offmy leg 
and dropped it in the refuse for someone to collect and toss 
into the fire. How can you stand there talking about care of 
my leg? (Coetzee 2005: 10) 
Paul's problem, however, rests principally on the lack of heart involved in this 
care. 
"The nurses are good ... but beneath their brisk 
efficiency he can detect. .. a final indifference; from young Dr 
Hansen he feels, beneath the kindly concern, the same 
indifference." (Coetzee 2005: 12) 
"So young and yet so heartless!" is his plaintiff cry to himself in response to this 
lack of care. His first nurse, Sheena, similarly cares without heart, without regard for 
his dignity or his feelings. She calls his leg his stump - care for it is "stump care" -
and his genitals, his "willie." (Coetzee 2005: 23) 
Although Marijana gives care with dignity - "she treats him not as a doddering 
old fool but as a man hampered in his movements by injury" - she too gives care 
without heart, without love: "Marijana, it would appear, could not care less whether 
he has women in the flat." (Coetzee 2005: 28; 39) Medical care is constituted 
throughout the novel as care without heart; a laissezfaire care of the wallet, found 
like the medical aid card in the wallet, rather than the "loving care" to which 
Elizabeth Costello expressly refers. That "kind of care" is "not found in any nursing 
home she is aware of." (Coetzee 2005: 261) 
When Paul states, "1 would prefer to take care of myself," he makes a plea for 
self-sufficiency. (Coetzee 2005: 10) Later, when he thinks of the preparations he has 











I will be able to take care of myself." (Coetzee 2005: 17) The words become a 
euphemism for his own willingness to commit suicide. Like the dog his father "takes 
care of' with a shotgun in the woods, he - a dog, with a dog's life - expresses his 
commitment to violence against himself as manner of "taking care." (Coetzee 2005: 
44; 26) This commitment of care for the self, whether violent or otherwise, is at least 
commitment based, contra medical care, in feeling and the heart. 
Significantly the care that comes from the heart is itself ambivalent; either 
harmful or helpful. Care from the heart, though preferable to care without heart, may 
also come without recognition or requiring response from whom it is directed. Care 
must be given with heart, but it must also be allowed to be acknowledged. Without 
acknowledgment, care remains an obligation whose return is not executable. A gift, in 
Attridge's terms, without a means of return. 
Though Marijana's care acknowledges Paul's dignity as an other, it still denies 
him the right to respond to that care and acknowledge its significance. While it is a 
dignified care-giving, it is not dignified care-taking. It does not allow for a return of 
care from the cared-for, robbing him of the dignity that the caring seems at such pains 
to protect. 
In his collection of essays about censorship, Giving OjJense17, JM Coetzee 
describes "innocence" and "dignity" as constructed fictions: "Innocence is a state in 
which we try to maintain our children; dignity is a state we claim for ourselves." 
(Coetzee 1996: 14) Affronts to these are not therefore attacks "upon our essential 
being but upon constructs - constructs by which we live, but constructs nevertheless." 
(Coetzee 1996: 14) While we may feel affronts to the constructs, and the feelings may 
be real, they are nevertheless based on 
A foundational fiction to which we more or less 
wholeheartedly subscribe, a fiction that may well be 
indispensable for ajust society, namely, that human beings 
have a dignity that sets them apart from animals and 
consequently protects them from being treated like animals. 
(Coetzee 1996:14) 
As has already been suggested, one of Paul's preeminent concerns forms itself 
around a protection of this "foundational fiction". His ambivalence about the gift of 











dignity. Dignity in this situation becomes ambiguous. Although respect for dignity 
becomes a manner of caring quite different to the indifferent "economic" caring of the 
medical fraternity, it also impedes the return of care. Paul cannot acknowledge the 
value of the bicycle as its reception would make him ridiculous: "a figure of fun ... 
one of the quaint types who lend colour to the social fabric." (Coetzee 2005: 256) 
Only after the "moral rout", when he feels "ashamed of himself', can Paul 
acknowledge the care given. The gift typifies the violent imposition of care - it 
renders Paul's complaint morally questionable - but, more significantly, Paul's 
response to it - "he will never put it to use" (Coetzee 2005: 256) - prevents him from 
acknowledging its benefits. He becomes obliged, by the violent imposition ofthe 
care, but refuses, because of his "foundational fiction", the empowering 
acknowledgment ofthat care. Without acknowledging, or responding to, the care, it 
has the nuanced violence of imposition without a concomitant relief of gratitude. 
Michel de Montaigne, at one point in his essay "On Affectionate 
Relationships,,19, writes if"one ... givers] to the other it is the one who received the 
benefaction who would lay[ s] an obligation on his companion." (Montaigne 1991: 
214) Since the act of giving empowers the giver, the recipient's creation of the 
opportunity to give makes the giver beholden to the recipient for that power. It puts 
into the giver's hands, "the means of doing him good." (Montaigne 1991: 215) When 
Paul is allowed to acknowledge his debt to Marijana, by expressing his desire to "live 
in a shed in your back yard and watch over you ... over all of you" (Coetzee 2005: 
251), she completes her contract to care for him. Marijana recognises his desire to 
"watch over" her and her family as legitimate, and legitimates it further with a kiss on 
each cheek. She says, 
'But you not pretending, eh?' 
'No.' 
'Yeah, I know that.' (Coetzee 2005: 250) 
By authorising his care of her family, she empowers him to give care. The 
violence of care becomes mitigated in this event because it is a care that does not deny 
the cared-for's right to respond. 
Paul Rayment is the novel's focaliser. As the central consciousness, he mediates 
the novel. Significantly as the recipient of care, he becomes a voice for the cared-for-











violence against those people to be benefited. Slow Man demonstrates how 
problematic the solipsistic care, idealised in Age of Iron, may be in regarding its 
recipients. 
For the difference in the treatment of care in Slow Man to its treatment in Age of 
Iron lies in shifting the focus from those who "take" care to those who receive it. Paul 
Rayment, forced to engage the services of a nurse, becomes subject to the ethic of 
gratitude in a way that Mrs. Curren, relatively self-sufficient despite her cancer, does 
not. In fact, seen in this light, Paul Rayment's responses to his ethical predicament, 
his apparent ingratitude and his repeated attempts to maintain the sense of his own 
independence, might explain the responses of Vercueil to Curren's attempts at 
imposing on him an "ethic of gratitude" through her charity or gift of care. 
An Ethic of Gratitude 
In the Elizabeth Costello story, "As a Woman Grows Older", Costello is faced 
by what she calls the 'ambivalence' of her children. She believes her son and her 
daughter have conspired to coincide visits in order to propose some means of taking 
care of her. 
Whatever the proposal it is they have to put to her, it is 
sure to be full of ambivalence: love and solicitude on the one 
hand, brisk heartlessness on the other, and a wish to see the 
end of her. (Coetzee 2004c: 1) 
She evinces an awareness of precisely the dynamics of Coezee' s ambivalence in 
the use of the word, "care" and the phrase, "taking care". Moreover, she admits that 
this is an authorial instinct. 
She has made a living out of ambivalence. Where would 
the art of fiction be if there were no double meanings? What 
would life itself be if there were only heads or tails and 
nothing in between? (Coetzee 2004c: 1) 
The dialogic content of these rhetorical questions reiterates the need to move 
beyond the simple binary opposites of is and is not, meaning this and not meaning 











write" that Coetzee invokes the middle voice between the active and passive voices.2o 
"To write (middle) is to carry out the action (or better, to do-writing) with reference to 
the self." (Coetzee 1992: 94) 
Jacques Derrida deals with the middle voice of the verb to love in the opening 
chapter of The Politics of Friendship.21 The term he uses, derived from Abdelkebir 
Khatibi, is aimance - the middle voice between loving and being-loved. To 
extrapolate on Coetzee's mediation of Barthes's comment on writing, "to love" in the 
middle voice would leave the loving self within the function of the sentence. Aimance 
therefore involves a definition of the loving self in the sentence of its loving by virtue 
of its loving act. The "friend" who loves, becomes a "friend", where "friend" is 
virtually synonymous with "lover", because he or she loves. 
The consequence, however, negatively affects the beloved, who does not derive 
the same benefit of identity in aimance as the lover. The beloved does not act in 
becoming beloved - it is the passive consequence of the being-loved. The situation of 
the lover, therefore, takes precedence over the potentiality of the beloved. This, 
Derrida suggests, may be derived from Aristotle: Aristotle's "On Friendship" 
identifies the participation in loving to be "more worthwhile" than the being loved. "A 
singular preference destabilizes and renders dissymmetrical the equilibrium of all 
difference: an it is more worthwhile gives precedence to the act over potentiality." 
(Derrida 2005: 7) 
The care-taker and cared-for occupy the same positions as the loverlbeloved. 
Care, in the middle voice, care nee, instantiates the author of that care in the act of 
caretaking. But, again, in the position as author of the act, the care-taker has 
precedence over the passivity involved in being-cared-for. Moreover, though this 
passivity involves the surrender of the self to the other, the surrender takes the form of 
an inexpressible obligation to the author. The "unfreedom" of the cared-for occurs in 
the failure of Love to function as a command without the related effects of obligation 
and inequality. 
The ambivalence of caring contains the implicit desire to see an end to the one 
for whom one cares. Not simply, as Costello expresses it, as the resolution of a 
problem, but because the knowledge that loving or care brings - the intention of 
loving or care that is necessary to the act of loving or caring - may pre-empt the death 
of the one who is loved or cared for by prefiguring the possibility of their death. As 











caring, their access to the knowledge of loving or caring is limited to the 
consequences of either loving or caring. Nor is there imposed on them an obligation 
to which the lover or carer is not answerable: their care must end at the death of either 
their lover/carer or themselves. 
Costello's resistance, therefore, though it seems limited to her children's 
"ambivalence", carries with it the resonance of worry about the loss of power to 
consider or care beyond the fact of death. Though she realises her children are "good, 
dutiful, as children go", later she thinks, as the three of them stay up talking and 
playing cards, "They are not children, none of them. For good or ill they are all 
together now in the same leaky boat called life ... Can they learn to live together 
without eating one another?" (Coetzee 2004c: 1; 9-10) For the very basis of her 
children's worry for her relies on their relational identities as her children, and, 
though each identifies her- or himself as such, this bond is a paradox: "the first lesson 
of paradox ... is not to rely on paradox. If you rely on paradox, paradox will let you 
down." (Coetzee 2004c: 12) 
Costello resolves the apparent ingratitude of her refusal of her son's care with a 
compensatory offer of shelter in Melbourne. As the story ends with this offer, with 
Costello's inversion of her children's attempts at care-taking with an offer of care 
from herself, John's response to her offer remains outside the ambit of the fictional 
discourse. But the resolution, and it is a re-solution, restores the imbalance of the 
children's caring, the children's occupation of the positions of care-taking, with 
Costello occupying the position of care-taker too - whether they wish to come "as 
visitors ... as refugees ... to reunir lafamille." Costello's reciprocal invitation is her 
means of re-empowerment, by assuming a role as party to the ethic of gratitude. 
David Lurie realises, after his relationship with Lucy completely breaks down, 
that he cannot assume the rights of the father over her; that she, as an adult, may 
refuse his offers of care with relative impunity and he cannot impose on her an 
obligation without alienating her still further. After a time, therefore, when he comes 
to visit her, he clears his throat both to attract her attention and to distract himself 
from his turning her into a scene from rural life. She asks him to "come in and have 
some tea", to which he thinks, "She makes the offer as if he were a visitor. Good. 
Visitorship, visitation: a new footing, a new start." (Coetzee 2000: 218) The new 
footing, the new start, that positions him as supplicant, endorses Lucy's right to take 











visitor, of the visitant as Attridge calls Vercueil, in an "ethic of obligation" takes an 
active role in and of itself. It too, however, relies on an "ethic of gratitude." 
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Chapter Three: Reciprocal Poetics: Genre and Language in Youth 
There are other ways too, it appears, in which prose is not like poetry. In poetry the 
action can take place everywhere and nowhere: it does not matter whether the lonely 
wives of the fisherman live in Kalk Bay or Portugal or Maine. Prose, on the other 
hand, seems naggingly to demand a specific setting. 
- J. M. Coetzee, Youth 
The discussions of Chapters One and Two concern themselves primarily with 
the poetics of reciprocity within the genre of the novel. Their critical approach to 
poetics is restricted to the confines of a particular truth-content (fiction) within a 
particular language (English). The purpose of this chapter is to examine Coetzee's 
poetics of reciprocity as it functions to critique genre and the contexts of language in 
his second autobiographical fiction: Youth. l The differend of Youth is its displacement 
of generic identity by virtue of its deconstruction of that identity. By examining the 
coincidence of the issues with genre brought up in the text and in the publication 
history around the text, this chapter shifts its attention from the thematic analyses that 
categorise Chapters One and Two to the interplay that exists between texts, their 
generic constructions, and their settings. In exploring the nuances of genre and mode, 
it draws on the work of Gerard Genette and Jacques Derrida to show the inescapable, 
reciprocal, connection between texts and genres. The chapter seeks to demonstrate a 
co-dependence between genre and setting: that the critique of genre implicit in Youth 
is inextricably linked to a critique of place. 
John, the narrator of Youth, decides to move the mode of his writing from 
poetry to prose. The shift, however, has correspondent affect on the setting of his 
work. Despite John's desire to leave South Africa behind, he finds himself incapable 
of setting his stories anywhere else: "he does not as yet know England well enough to 
do England in prose." (Coetzee 2002a: 63) His anxiety about setting corresponds to an 
anxiety the work sets up between genre and mode. Although Youth is generically 
autobiographical, its narrative method or mode (third person, present tense) marks it 
as a fiction. The anxiety young John feels in locating his prose in South Africa 
corresponds with Coetzee's anxiety about locating prose within generic constraints. 
Yet "Prose ... seems naggingly to demand a specific setting." (Coetzee 2002a 63) 
Similarly generic association is inevitable: "a text," writes Jacques Derrida, "cannot 











This chapter examines the poetics involved in depicting the antagonism of a 
work to its generic confines and the analogous antagonism of the young colonial to 
the confines of locatability. By showing that Coetzee avoids a resolution of genre and 
setting, it also demonstrates the reciprocal natures of genre and setting in poetic works 
clarifying the notion of a poetics of reciprocity. 
Poetics 
A poetics, when one returns to its Aristotelian origins, is the systematic 
examination of those parts that make up the essential quality of a literary work. 
Aristotle introduces his poetics: 
I propose to treat of poetry in itself and of its various 
kinds, noting the essential quality of each, to inquire into the 
structure of the plot as requisite to a good poem; into the 
number and nature of the parts of which a poem is composed; 
and similarly into whatever else falls within the same inquiry. 
Following, then, the order of nature, let us begin with the 
principles which come first. 3 
Poetics, according to Aristotle, is a systematic process of categorisation: an 
examination of "number and nature of the parts" ofa work from which a philosophy 
of poetry can be established. 
Coetzee, speaking of storytelling in "The Novel Today" in resistance to the 
relegation of a work to history and genre, identifies it as "another, an other mode of 
thinking. " 
A story is not a message with a covering, a rhetorical or 
aesthetic covering. It is not a message plus a residue, the 
residue, the art with which the message is coated with the 
residue, forming the subject matter of rhetoric or aesthetics or 
literary appreciation. There is no addition in stories. They are 
not made up of one thing plus another thing, message plus 
another thing, message plus vehicle, substructure plus 
superstructure ... There is always a difference, and the 











The story has no "essential quality" which analysis can render down. Nor can it 
be divided into a number of parts to reveal the quality of its whole. The attempt to 
render the story explicable by analytical thinking reduces it either to a message or a 
sum of aesthetic devices. The story, for Coetzee, has a remainder that exists beyond 
either the message or the medium. Therefore remaining true to Coetzee's mode of 
thinking requires a poetics that avoids its traditional Aristotelian categorisation by 
alluding to the difference existent beyond its own categories. Youth, as a work 
particularly noted for its transgression of genre, provides a basis for a discussion 
about the "difference" that generic instability contributes to poetics. 
An examination of Youth's publication reveals interesting disparities between 
the United States and United Kingdom editions. 5 The United States publisher's 
addition of the subtitle, Scenes from Provincial Life II, identifies the novel as the 
sequel to Boyhood: Scenes from Provincial Life (I) for the American reader. The 
United Kingdom edition, lacking the subtitle, has no such explicit connection to 
Boyhood. Examining the American edition of Boyhood discloses a generic 
significance to the American link that would be unappreciated by readers of the UK 
edition. For both Boyhood: Scenes from Provincial Life and Youth in their UK print 
are labelled "fiction" as the generic designation on their back covers.6 While Youth: 
Scenes from Provincial Life II has no generic designation, the American edition of 
Boyhood: Scenes from Provincial Life has the additional subtitle "A Memoir" on the 
front cover. 7 Its back cover has the label, "Biography/Autobiography." 
Notwithstanding the discrepancies between memoir and autobiography, the absence 
of genre for the American edition of Youth is filled by the implicit genre of its 
antecedent, Boyhood. The common subtitle, and the addendum to it, "IF', on the cover 
of Youth, places the American edition in the general precinct of autobiography. 
The publication history of the novel demonstrates the difficulties the novel 
presents to general debate about poetics: issues in poetics relating to genre and 
classification. It also reminds the reader about questions raised by Coetzee in 
"Confessions and Double Thoughts: Tolstoy, Rousseau, Dostoevsky.,,8 Called 
"pivotal" by Coetzee, the essay retains sufficient relevance to Coetzee's later work to 
warrant a title mention in James Ley's review of Inner Workings: Essays 2000-2005, 
"True Confession.,,9 "Because of the nature of consciousness, Dostoevsky indicates, 











of self-deception." (Coetzee 1992: 291) Telling the truth of oneself to one's self is 
Coetzee's description of a confessional mode of writing: writing with "an underlying 
motive to tell an essential truth about the self." (Coetzee 1992: 252) By indicating the 
rupture between the motive to tell an essential truth about the self and the inability to 
tell such a truth categorically, Coetzee demonstrates the disjuncture between the mode 
of confession and the confessional genre. For, while the style of writing (mode) is 
confessional, the genre or category of the work must be a fiction. The confessional 
mode (telling an essential truth) is at odds with the genre it inhabits (where truths told 
are self-delusions). As Coetzee makes a point of distinguishing confession from 
memoir and apology in his essay, it is not part of this argument to examine Youth as a 
confession. However, the essay's concern with autobiography, and with the ruptures 
in genre and mode, makes it a useful starting point for a discussion of genre in 
Youth. \0 
Genres 
"Differends are born ... from these encounters." II (Lyotard 1988: 29) "The 
differend is the unstable state and instant of language wherein something which must 
be able to be put into phrases cannot yet be." (Lyotard 1988: 13) As only one phrase 
universe can take precedence, the differend occurs in its dominance over the others. 
Genres of discourse, however, avoid the differends of phrases by fixing the rules by 
which the phrases are linked; "Genres of discourse determine stakes, they submit 
phrases from different regimens to a single finality: the question, the example, the 
argument, the narration, the exclamation are in forensic rhetoric the heterogeneous 
means of persuading." (Lyotard 1988: 29) They avoid the differends between phrases 
by orientating different phrases toward a single end. However, the consequence is that 
the differend occurs between genres rather than between individual phrases. 
In an effort to disentangle the issue of genre and mode, I turn to the work of 
another linguist, Gerard Genette. Genette, whose work is the basis for Derrida's 
argument in "The Law of Genre", examines the differences between mode and genre: 
differences that roughly correlate to the discrepancy Lyotard notices between phrases 
from different regimens and the genres that order them. 
Genette, in examining the history of genres, returns to the process of 











into designating a tripartition by which works of literature may be divided. Three 
genres are evident: the lyric, the epic, and the dramatic. The distinction, as described 
by Austin Warren, follows: 
Lyric poetry is the poet's own persona; in epic poetry 
(or the novel) the poet partly speaks in his own person, as 
narrator, and partly makes his characters speak in direct 
discourse (mixed narrative); in drama, the poet disappears 
behind his cast of characters. (Genette 1992: 4) 
Genette observes that these distinctions do not illustrate a system of genres, as 
presented by genre theorists. Rather they are modes. (Genette 1992: 12) Genres 
incorporate modes insofar as the text requires a particular way of writing to 
correspond to certain thematic and aesthetic concerns. Genres are "properly 
aesthetic", meaning "their defining criteria always involve a thematic element that 
eludes purely formal or linguistic description." (Genette 1992: 64) However, modes 
are forms of utterance: 
Modes are categories that belong to linguistics ... They 
are "natural forms" ... in his wholly relative sense ... to the 
extent that language and its use appear as facts of nature vis-a-
vis the conscious and deliberate elaboration of aesthetic forms. 
(Genette 1992: 64) 
The history of genre, as mapped out by Genette, demonstrates a systemic 
conflation of mode with genre. The modes of writing mapped out by Aristotle's 
Poetics have become synonymous with the thematic concerns, leading to the genres 
into which writing may be categorised. 
Lyrical, epical, and dramatic contrast with Dichtarten 
no longer as modes of verbal enunciation that precede and are 
external to any literary definition but, rather, as kinds of 
archigenres. Archi-, because each of them is supposed to 
overarch and include, ranked by degree of importance, a 
certain number of empirical genres that - whatever their 
amplitude, longevity, or potential for recurrence - are 











already) -genres, because ... their defining criteria always 
involve a thematic element that eludes purely formal or 
linguistic description. (Genette 1992: 64-65) 
Genette's effort is primarily to disentangle the "naturalness" of mode from the 
structure of genre. Although the mode may convey a particular point, its ethical and 
aesthetic force comes from its occurrence within a specific genre. Poetics, as the 
analysis of the aesthetic and ethical qualities of a work, or works, ofliterature, has 
become an examination of genre. 
In Coetzee's case, where genre proves difficult to categorise, establishing a 
poetics for his work must involve a self-reflexive process wherein the works are 
demonstrated to critique the genres to which they appear to conform. Coincidental to 
the discussion of Youth, Genette uses autobiography as a case example for the 
separation of genre and mode: he invokes Philippe Lejeune's definition of 
autobiography as "a retrospective prose narrative produced by a real person 
concerning his own existence, focusing on his individual life, in particular the 
development of his personality." (Genette 1992: 79) Genette calls the definition 
"typically Aristotelian and strictly atemporal", "combining features that are thematic 
(the growth of a genuine individual), modal (a retrospective autodiegetic narration), 
and formal (in prose)." (Genette 1992: 79) 
Youth is extraordinary in that it is neither "retrospective" nor "autodiegetic" in 
the conventional sense. The mode is a present tense, third person narration. Given the 
ambiguity of its generic classification in publication, this mode has elicited a fair 
amount of critical attention. William Deresiewicz claims that, "aside from raising 
large questions about his relationship with himself, these bizarre choices mean that 
Coetzee has turned his back on the entire autobiographical tradition." 13 Derek 
Attridge adopts a contrary approach; from the assumption that it is a confessional 
autobiography, though not of an "orthodox sort", he examines Boyhood and Youth to 
• • • 14 
ascertam Its veracIty. 
Genette's distinction between mode and genre renders the critical judgments 
about Youth and autobiography suspect: Genette, Lejeune, Deresiewicz, and Attridge 
all claim the autobiographical genre is dependent on a specific mode. Rather than 
conforming to the atemporal, Aristotelian definition of autobiography, the mode of 











autobiography. Presented in the present tense, it has no older, retrospective narrator 
identifying "pivotal" points in the development of his character. Told in the third 
person singular, Youth does not even acknowledge the author as a participant in the 
events that take place. 
To be fair, Attridge's examination of Boyhood and Youth locates, within the 
mode of third-person, present-tense diegesis, a place for the truth-seeking function of 
confession; his approach is critical insofar as he attributes to the mode a fictional 
status that allows the truth of autobiography to be staged: a staging that shows that the 
truth may never be told. Coetzee presents an aphorism for his position on 
autobiography; expressed in his "Retrospect Interview" with David Attwell in 
Doubling the Point, he says, "all autobiography is storytelling, all writing is 
autobiography."J5 Attridge correlates the fictional mode of Boyhood and Youth to a 
theory akin to Coetzee's: the constructed nature of autobiography calls into question 
the truth claims that autobiography makes. By decentring the narrating subject and 
upsetting the temporal sense of past and present, Coetzee makes explicit the 
fictionality of his autobiographical fictions. However, Attridge seems to position the 
texts as confessional autobiographies, despite their mode of representation. Genette' s 
distinction enables me to depart from this oppositional thinking. 
For, while I am in agreement with Attridge in reading the works as subversive 
of the "system" of autobiographical writing, the argument may be extended beyond its 
occluding historical fact with a third person narration. After all, the applicability of 
historical fact, Coetzee argues, is contingent upon the thematic mediation of whoever 
narrates it. Coetzee notes that Thomas Pringle's poem, 'The Bechuana Boy', "draws 
on a real-life person, an orphan named Hinza Marossi."J6 
Hinza is an 'actual person' ... But we derive his 
actuality more from Pringle's notes and letters than from the 
poem itself, which, aside from the frank liberties it takes with 
facts .... through its diction draws us away from the specificity 
of Africa towards a generalised landscape of the Romantic 
sublime dotted with the more celebrated African mammalian 
fauna. (Coetzee 2002b: 253) 
The thematic concerns of Pringle's poetry overcame his adherence to 











European imagination for discovery in Africa." (Coetzee 2002b: 254) Historical fact 
is subverted by the thematic concerns of the artist, ethical or aesthetic. Genre may 
include modes as the means to further its literary project but a mode lacks an 
essentialist ideological function. It is only in the context of genre that the mode 
assumes a particular ideological stance. 
In the case of Youth, the mode carries an autobiographical impetus from 
Coetzee's "Retrospect Interview", given as an end-piece to Doubling the Point some 
ten years before Youth's publication. The "Retrospect" is simultaneously a reflection 
on the essays collected in Doubling the Point and an admission of the biographical 
impulse behind their production. In illustrating the second point, Coetzee uses the 
mode of third person, present tense to tell the story of his younger self. Youth is 
written in the same mode, is based on similar experiences, and has the already 
mentioned link to autobiography in its American publication. However, using the 
paratext of his Retrospect interview seems to repeat the error Coetzee observes in 
contemporary treatments of Thomas Pringle: 
It is certainly possible, using all the textual sources 
available to us, to read back into the poem some of its 
historical fullness; but we must realise that to read Pringle 
thus is to some extent to read him against the grain, counter to 
his own poetic exertions. (Coetzee 2002b: 254) 
It is only as a critique of autobiographical writing that the mode of Youth's 
narration takes on the significance attributed to it by Deresiewicz and Attridge; its 
identity as a critique is contingent on its existence within the genre of 
autobiographical writing. The genre of the work must be pre-empted in order to 
acknowledge Youth's criticisms of the genre. Positing Youth as either fiction or 
autobiography shows the truth in Derrida's aforementioned observation: a text may be 
read in a variety of contexts; what is certain is that it will be read in a context. 
Derek Attridge, searching for intertexts, identifies two other Youths as 
precedents; the first is Tolstoy's fictionalised memoir Youth: Scenes from a 
Provincial Life and the second is Conrad's fictional sea-story Youth. (Attridge 2005: 
156) Hermione Lee's review of Youth identifies it as a Kiinstlerroman in the tradition 











precedent by which the work's uniqueness may be tempered with its architext: the 
generic of which it may be demonstrated as a type. 
The elimination of mode and publication label as the means for assigning 
geme disrupts the traditional means for realising the work is about a "real person." In 
part, Coetzee' s suspicion of "real people" in literary texts - as evinced in his treatment 
of Hinza - complicates Youth as a generic type. In part, its own deconstruction of 
generic types undermines its reception as a critique of autobiography. For the means 
for instantiating it within the autobiographical geme, I return to the geme of 
Kunstlerroman: the literary self-portrait of the artist. 
On his rejection of Marie, the New Zealand woman who stays with him for a 
period in his professor's house in Gardens, John reflects on his reading of Hemy 
Miller. "Were Hemy Miller merely a satyr, a monster of indiscriminate appetite, he 
could be ignored. But Henry Miller is an artist, and his stories, outrageous though 
they may be and probably full of lies, are stories of an artist's life." (Coetzee 2002: 
29) A repeated concern of the youth's rhetoric is "the artist's life." It seems his 
anxiety stems from his failure to live "the artist's life." When Jacqueline, the nurse he 
lives with in his one roomed flat, leaves him, he reflects on the tension between his 
personal proclivities and his adherence to the notion of "the artist's life." 
He must return to living by himself, and there will be 
no little relief in that. Yet he cannot live alone for ever. 
Having mistresses is part of an artist's life: even if he steers 
clear of the trap of marriage, as he will certainly do, he is 
going to have to find a way of living with women. Art cannot 
be fed on deprivation alone, on longing, loneliness. There 
must be intimacy, passion, love as well. (Coetzee 2002a: 10) 
The geme of the artist's life - the Kunstlerroman - is one that has been 
mapped out by John in his reading of Miller and Lawrence, albeit presented by 
Coetzee in a parodical fashion. But, while he admits that Miller's work is 
"outrageous" and "probably full of lies," he still wishes to emulate the generic Miller 
embodies. Miller's narrator, in Tropic o/Cancer, sets himself the compact that he 
will, "not change a line of what [he] writes.,,18 
I am not interested in perfecting my thoughts, nor my 











of Dostoevski ... Here, then, in one and the same medium, we 
have two kinds of perfection. But in Van Gogh's letters there 
is a perfection beyond either of these. It is the triumph of the 
individual over art. (Miller 1965: 19) 
He continues that the only thing that interests him is "the recording of all that 
is omitted in books." (Miller 1965: 19) John, therefore, desires to live a life inspired 
by books whose primary object is to overcome the constraints of literary devices and 
the constructed nature of art. In aspiring to live a life of ideals, John provides a 
critique of Miller's attempt to render his experience as truthfully (and therefore as 
perfectly) as he can: "Even Henry Miller, who presents himself as such a 
straightforward fellow, ready to make love to any woman no matter her shape or size, 
probably has a dark side which he is prudent enough to conceal." (Coetzee 2002a: 30) 
By turning Miller's life into a constructed ideal against which he sets his own 
experience, John reveals the pretence involved in claiming an authenticity or truth in 
autobiographical experience; even that mediated by a claim of fictionality. 
The genre of the artist's life develops during the course of the novel. But it 
retains the sense that it is through artistic constructedness that truth is possible: 
On the basis of the poems he has heard on the radio 
and nothing else, he knows Brodsky knows him through and 
through. That is what poetry is capable of. Poetry is truth. But 
of him in London Brodsky can know nothing. (Coetzee 2002a: 
91) 
John believes Brodsky "knows" him, without any knowledge of the specificity 
of his condition. Moreover, he can know Brodsky knows because of Brodsky's poems 
"and nothing else." The "nothing else" is a point in the narration where the invisible 
narrator's criticism of John is evident; John, in his knowledge, would not need to 
emphasise the singularity of his source material, given its pre-eminence as evidence 
of "truth." Poetry is a reciprocal truth mechanism: from it John can know what 
Brodsky knows, even as it conveys Brodsky's knowledge of what John knows. The 
intercession of a narrating consciousness behind John's "he" upsets the poetic 
reciprocity by pointing out its lack of paratextual evidence. Brodsky lives in a gulag 











the means to contact the other, even if Brodsky knew of the existence of the South 
African exile. The lack of evidence makes John's feelings of camaraderie appear 
facile; the irony, of course, is that the only evidence the reader has to make such an 
observation is the artwork in front of him or her. John's life of the artist, as a genre, 
relies on messages that transcend the mundanities of contextual existence. The 
"realities" of John's experiences, themselves evoked by "the life of the artist" genre, 
coincide to undermine his transcendental escape from context. 
The exception to these two examples comes in his encounter with Beckett's 
Watt. From the serif font "that evokes for him intimacy, solidity" to the pace, "fitted 
exactly to the pace of his own mind," Watt provides an exception to both the "life of 
the artist" that John tries to live and the "life of the artist" he is living. (Coetzee 
2002a: 155) Comparing Beckett (eventually the focus of his Doctoral dissertation) to 
Ford (the then current focus of his Master's dissertation), John realises an affection 
for the Irishman's writings lacking in his examination of the works of the English 
German. 
How could he have imagined he wanted to write in the 
manner of Ford when Beckett was around all the time? In 
Ford there has always been an element of the stuffed shirt that 
he has disliked but has been hesitant to acknowledge, 
something to do with the value Ford placed in knowing where 
in West End to buy the best motoring gloves or how to tell a 
Medoc from a Beaune; whereas Beckett is classless, or outside 
class, as he himself would prefer to be. (Coetzee 2002a: 155) 
His affinity is with a writer who is outside class, in the socio-economic sense. 
But it is also with a writer who is outside the classifications of the "life of the artist." 
The comparison is evident in the differences between Coetzee's Master's dissertation 
on Ford Madox Ford l9 and his Doctoral dissertation on Samuel Beckett.2o The 
Master's dissertation states that it "is not biographical. It does, however, attempt to 
suggest the main lines ofFord's life and their immediate effect on his writing." 
(Coetzee 1963: x) The difference in linguistic precision is obvious in the following 
passage from his Doctoral dissertation: 
Unless the focus of a study is biographical, the 











and syntax" into "a writer's syntactic habits reveal his habits 
ofthought" is tautologous, since the habits of a writer's mind 
can only be a metaphor for habits (or patterns) of the text. The 
question is of course thrown open again if instead of the writer 
we speak of a fictionalised intelligence in the text. (Coetzee 
1969: 158-159) 
The extract is from his argument against Richard Ohmann's theory on the 
deep structure of sentences. Ohmann, Coetzee summarises, sees syntax as revealing 
"in a direct way the writer's way of ordering experience: the form ofthe deep 
structure of a sentence is the form of the thought that the sentence expresses." 
(Coetzee 1969: 157) Coetzee's criticism of Ohmann is that he conceives of a "real 
person", whose thoughts are trapped in the process of writing. But the text only 
conveys a trace of the writing process having taken place. The affect of Ford's life on 
his work, in these terms, becomes a fruitless quest. The paratexts through which 
Ford's "life" is established cannot be compared to the "life" derived from his mode of 
writing. The shift in Coetzee's critical work, from examining the coincidence oflife 
and art to a realisation of the fallacy of such an examination, resonates with a 
correspondent shift in Youth: "the life of the artist", after his encounter with Beckett, 
ceases to be the mould into which John aspires to fit himself. 
Rather "the life of the artist", as a generic construct, ceases to be a class to 
which he feels himself bound. From the binary of his artist ideal and his inadequacy 
before that ideal, the possibility emerges that he need not feel the European "angst" 
he craves - that he too may exist outside of class or genre. Following his reading of 
Watt John studies the history oflogic. He attempts to find "the moment in history 
when either-or is chosen and and/or discarded." (Coetzee 2002a: 160) The moment of 
its reversal is, for John, his reading of Beckett. From that point on, John ceases to 
pursue "the life of the artist", and begins to live his life as an individual. Coetzee's 
essay on Beckett in Inner Workings: Essays 2000-2005 identifies Beckett as "an artist 
possessed by a vision of life without consolation or dignity or promise of grace, in the 
face of which our only duty - inexplicable and futile of attainment, but a duty 
nonetheless - is not to lie to ourselves.,,21 The contiguities between the young narrator 











Beckett, for it is soon after his reading of Watt that John captures his realisation of the 
futility of living a generic life with the following passage: 
Experience: that is the word he would like to fall back 
on to justify himselfto himself. The artist must taste all 
experience, from the noblest to the most degraded. Just as it is 
the artist's destiny to experience the most supreme creative 
joy, so he must be prepared to take upon himself all in life that 
is miserable, squalid, ignominious. It was in the name of 
experience that he underwent London .... Stages in the poet's 
life, all of them, in the testing of his soul... It is a justification 
that does not for a moment convince him ... 
It is sophistry, that is all, contemptible sophistry. And 
ifhe is further going to claim that, just as sleeping with Astrid 
and her teddy bear was getting to know moral squalor, so 
telling self-justifying lies to oneself is getting to know 
intellectual squalor first hand, then sophistry will only become 
more contemptible. There is nothing to be said for it; nor, to 
be ruthlessly honest, is there anything to be said for its having 
nothing to be said for it. As for ruthless honesty, ruthless 
honesty is not a hard trick to learn. (Coetzee 2002a: 164) 
The realisation is coupled with a deconstruction of the mode of its realisation; 
with each term used to express the realisation of the generic quality of his life, there is 
a corresponding dismissal of the adequacy of that term to express it. His attempts to 
justify himself to himself fail because they do not convince him. They do not 
convince him because they are based on sophistry, on the mode of their expression. 
Moreover, the mode of their failure to convince him - in an autobiographical 
interrogation - itself says nothing worth being said. The introspective "life of the 
artist" - "one eye has always to be turned inward" - is a fallacy, brought about by 
John's conflation of his mode, "self-interrogation," with the genre, of "life 
experience." The passage deconstructs the conflation. In systematically demonstrating 
the sophistry of his assumptions, John establishes a mode of questioning that takes 
apart its own thematic concerns as they arise. Rather than express "the life of the 











circumnavigate the internal justification that genre causes in mode by undermining 
the mode in its moment of expression. 
The mode of the passage is interrogative. But it is also presented in a "third 
person, present tense narration." In the latter sense, the mode of the work does interact 
with genre in the way argued for by Attridge and Deresiewicz. It distances the work 
from "autobiography", creating the sense of fiction rather than historical account. This 
aspect is important, given the corresponding distance John must adopt to the "facts" 
of his life in order to criticise them: a position enabled by Coetzee's distance from the 
"facts" of his autobiography. John's distinction of mode from genre, therefore, 
requires an interaction between mode and genre. Under scrutiny, Genette's distinction 
between mode and genre imagines a division impossible in its application. It 
nevertheless provides the means for articulating the reciprocity within Youth between 
its reliance on genre and mode, and its critique of genre and mode. 
When the mode of Youth is distinguished from its genre, the politics of the 
mode are shown to be the politics ofthe genre. But, with the interrogation of mode in 
John's self-analytical moment, there is also a critique of genre. The suggestion is that 
while genre and mode are engaged in different activities within a text, their interaction 
makes it impossible to disentangle the one from the other effectively without 
disrupting the sense of each. 
The differend, insofar as it has corne to have connotations of articulating a 
lacuna in speech between the marginalized and their authorities, also has a place in 
this dilemma. For, while genre and mode are too closely associated to disentangle, 
Youth, as a text that deconstructs the presumptions of genre, is engaged in staging a 
differend. Coetzee effectively engages with the conditions of his younger self. But, in 
doing so, he realises he must assume a distance from that self - in order to create a 
functioning character within a necessarily aesthetic text. He cannot articulate the 
distance within the text - it requires paratextual materials to confirm the genre before 
the mode's obvious discrepancy with that genre begins to make sense. But the 
reliance on paratextual data runs contrary to his own poetic exertions. Youth 
systematically thematizes "autobiography" within the story, only to render its devices 
- self-justification, honesty and transcendental experience - suspect. The publication 
history merely indicates the instability of generic identity that runs through the novel. 











John's issue with writing prose rather than poetry relates directly to his desire 
to avoid South Africa. His antagonism to South Africa aside, it also represents a 
generic regression from the universality of poetry to the specificity of prose. The 
result is an interrogation of place in the novel that attempts to undercut the importance 
of setting, while realising its inevitable importance to the structure of a prose work. 
Place and Emplacement 
That Scenes from Provincial Life II was not incorporated into the United 
Kingdom edition is understandable when one considers that most of the book takes 
place in London: British audiences might not have appreciated the intimation that the 
book, three quarters of which is set in their capital, describes scenes from a 
"provincial life." However, as William Deresiewicz defends it, "the subtitle is apt. .. 
for his move to England only makes more visible the psychic wounds of the young 
colonial." (Deresiewicz 2002: 1) London is mediated by John's introspective 
consciousness; the novel describes scenes from a provincial life, not from either a 
province or the life of a provincial. The novel demonstrates that the importance of 
place, a concern for John prior to and on his arrival at Southampton, is misplaced -
the experiences in a place pre-empt the conscious decision to ascribe an idealised 
importance to a particular place. 
Joseph Brodsky in his essay "A Place as Good as Any" writes of his tendency 
to remember not places but their picture-postcard representations.22 "There is perhaps 
nothing wrong," he says, "with this sort of reduction or swapping, for had a human 
mind indeed been able to cohere and retain the reality of this world, the life of its 
owner would become a non-stop nightmare of logic and justice." (Brodsky 1 995: 3 7-
38) Moreover, those "memories" are pre-empted by a collage of travel agents' 
posters. "Say "London" and your mind most likely will flash the view of the National 
Gallery or Tower Bridge with the Union Jack logo discreetly printed in a comer or on 
the opposite side." (Brodsky 1995: 37) 
The simplifying tendency that Brodsky describes has more onerous 
consequences than freeing the mind from a "non-stop nightmare of logic and justice." 
By translating his lived experience into picture-postcard representation, Brodsky 











to the gaudy monuments that have become the depersonalised representation ofthe 
city. 
The context of Brodsky's experience shifts with the generic models that come 
to replace his "actual" experience as an individual with those dictated to him by travel 
brochures. Brodsky's example associates "London" with the genre of personal 
account; it is his personal experience, after all, of London that incorporates the collage 
of travel agents' posters. However, it also associates "London" with the genre of those 
travel posters. Consequentially the genre of personal account becomes conflated with 
the genre oftravel magazines. In the conflation, travel posters and post-cards replace 
the personal account with one manufactured by package tour operators. 
Coetzee criticises national identity in his essay on "The 1995 World Cup", 
during which the representation of the host country (South Africa) "stepped a fine line 
between ethnic stereotyping and service of the Rainbow concept. ,,23 The team became 
the embodiment ofthe nation, while rugby was used "to promote the idea that a nation 
and a national-consciousness are to all intents and purposes the same thing, and 
therefore that sounds and images, if numerous and powerful enough, can create a 
nation." (Coetzee 2002b: 353) 
John lists the "two, perhaps three places in the world where life can be lived at 
its fullest intensity: London, Paris, perhaps Vienna." (Coetzee 2002a: 41) He chooses 
to live his life at its fullest intensity in London for the pragmatic reasons that people 
speak English and he will not have to carry papers. But his insistence on the primacy 
of European capitals stems from a postcard ofthe intellect: "London may be stony, 
labyrinthine, and cold, but behind its forbidding walls men and women are at work 
writing books, painting paintings, composing music." (Coetzee 2002a: 41) Though he 
does not prioritise the standard images of London - the National Gallery and Tower 
Bridge - attached to "London" as a referent is the emotional locale of culture and the 
artiste. 
Though broadly based on events from Coetzee's early adulthood (first as a 
student at the University of Cape Town, later as a computer programmer working in 
London), the third person, present tense narration acknowledges the distance from the 
events and the fictional presence of their "memories". Yet both narrative form and 
autobiographical content relate the novel back to the "Retrospect" of Doubling the 
Point - where a younger John Coetzee uses a similar form to tell a similar story. Part 











South Africa, "very much in the spirit of shaking the dust of the country from his 
feet." (Coetzee 1992: 393) The phrase is Biblical: it occurs in the Gospels according 
to Matthew, Mark and Luke.24 It forms part of the commandments Jesus gives to his 
disciples on sending them out to preach. From Mark: "And whosoever shall not 
receive you, nor hear you, when ye depart thence, shake off the dust under your feet 
for a testimony against them." (Mark 6:11) The allusion, also made in a speech 
accepting the Jerusalem Prize, heralds Coetzee's attempts to resign from the caste 
preference he enjoyed (a term employed with due irony) as a white male in Apartheid 
South Africa.25 But, given its Biblical antecedents, there is a measure of 
condemnation implicit in the act: "shaking the dust" is a testimony against those who 
neither receive you, nor hear you. The speech (though also in the novel and the 
retrospect), becomes an examination of the failure ofCoetzee's resignation and the 
failure of his condemnation. The speech, about the manifest bondage of South Africa 
and the South African writer, becomes a response to Milan Kundera's tribute to 
Miguel Cervantes presented on his reception of the same prize two years before. 
While Cervantes may have his mad knight leave behind "hot, dusty, tedious La 
Mancha and enter the world of faery", the South African novelist is prevented from 
similar flights by 
the crudity of life in South Africa, the naked force of its 
appeals, not only at the physical level but at the moral level 
too, its callousness and its brutalities, its hungers and its rages, 
its greed and its lies, [which] make it as irresistible as it is 
unlovable. (Coetzee 1992: 98-99) 
The link between this talk and Coetzee's autobiographical "Retrospect", itself 
intimately connected to Youth, suggests the failure of John to "transcend" his South 
African identity - to become a Londoner as he explicitly wishes - lies as much in the 
inability to sever himself from his past as in the feelings of alienness, rather than 
alienation, that accompany his experience of the metropole. 
As a brief vignette John's response to Foyles summarises his response to the 
London experience. "Foyles, the bookshop whose name is known as far away as Cape 
Town, has proved a disappointment." (Coetzee 2002a: 57) The bookstore, like 
London, proves disappointing compared with the idealised image John had of it, while 











clearly just that, a boast. Yet the boast, the lie, is exactly what has brought John to one 
of the "three places where life can be lived at its fullest intensity." Or so a superficial 
reading of the text would suggest. 
John, on his arrival, excuses his discomfort and his icy feet with, "No matter: 
he is in London." John constructs a London very different to the parochial Cape Town 
of his origins - a place from which he wishes "to flee", alternately escaping the 
political situation and going "abroad [to] devote himself to art." (Coetzee 2002a: 22) 
In fact, these constructions seem predominantly retrospective musings occurring only 
once he has arrived in the metropole. His time in Cape Town, characterised as it is 
with a desire to be "gone", has only a brief reference to the destination of his "going", 
and that is "England" rather than "London". His desire to leave Cape Town, whilst in 
Cape Town, translates not as the movement of the artist towards a centre, but rather as 
the desire of a young man to escape, to flee, the emotional hold of his family, country, 
and parochial existence. Coetzee writes, "He is in England, in London; he has ajob, a 
proper job, better than mere teaching. He has escaped South Africa." (Coetzee 2002a: 
47) The conclusion is that, though London is the place of artists and opportunities, his 
success - attaining his first goal - lies not in the place of arrival, but in leaving the 
place that he has left. 
London becomes valorised not for qualities endemic to his experience of it but 
in its representation of a life different to that he lived in "the colonies." His refusal to 
appreciate London as London becomes explicit in his interchanges with Caroline, a 
South African girl with whom an affair from his Cape Town days is resumed. She 
questions the sedentary life he leads: 
How can he come all the way to London, she says, and 
then spend his days adding up numbers on a machine? Look 
around, she says: London is a gallery of novelties and 
pleasures and amusements. Why does he not come out of 
himself, have some fun? 
'Some of us are not built for fun,' he replies. (Coetzee 
2002a: 77) 
His refusal to "have some fun" is indicative of his inability to acknowledge the 
London of his experience and, concomitantly, to discard the London constructed from 











scientist whose attitude to place seems so manifestly binary merely reinforces the 
already well-worn stereotype of splitting margin and centre, province and metropole, 
colony and capital. However, insofar as this split provides insight into John's 
treatment of place, it becomes worthwhile to carry it to its logical conclusion. 
His distinction rests on the assumption of some genius loci or intrinsic spirit 
endemic to each place. This manifests itself in objectifying the women of London, 
identifying them not by physical characteristics - apart from calling them "girls" - but 
by national identity. Caroline, a South African, is not as desirable as a Swedish or 
Italian "girl", even as these could not compare to a French "girl." Nationality, 
therefore, becomes a fetish for John where fetishism may be understood as an 
obsession representative, but not ultimately the embodiment, of a desire for some 
whole of which the obsession forms an associative part. When his cousin comes to 
London, and he accedes to the familial obligations, he reconciles her South African 
identity by recasting her as an "Aryan huntress." The cousin of his imagination 
becomes an object of desire, for she represents a union of London and Cape Town -
destination and origin. Only in London, so he would believe, can he meet his so-
called "Destined one" because only in London can his destiny manifest itself. Yet his 
cousin also represents "the promise of ease, of easiness: two people with a history in 
common, a country, a family." (Coetzee 2002a: 126) Even as he fetishises these 
qualities of his cousin, he begins a process of fetishising South Africa as a land of 
ongm. 
In White Writing, Coetzee describes a converse response on the part of 
European visitors to Africa. Rather than fetishise Africa as Africa, English writers 
sought to impose European conceptions of place on Africa: 
A self-defeating process of naming Africa by defining it 
as non-Europe - self-defeating because in each particular in 
which Africa is identified to be non-European, it remains 
Europe, not Africa, that is named. (Coetzee 1988b: 164) 
John implies a similar sentiment when he claims he could respond to 1820's 
Africa with a greater sense of its life than the contemporaneous William Burchell, 
"despite his energy and intelligence and curiosity and sang-froid", "because he was an 
Englishman in a foreign country, his mind half occupied with Pembroke shire and the 











Burchell lies the irony of John's decision to write about South Africa - a decision 
intimately connected with the second part of Dusklands. John cannot describe the city 
he inhabits - he is no Londoner - for the same reasons. He nevertheless tries to make 
sense of his internal turmoil by imposing it upon his location. Moreover, as an English 
speaking South African, his language is alien, not only to London but to South Africa 
as well: his ideal of describing South Africa can only reiterate the path of other 
attempts to describe the country in English: a description of Africa "as not-Europe, 
dramatizing it by antithesis, makes Africa into a mere negative reflection or shadow 
of Europe, insubstantial." (Coetzee 1988b: 170) In John's case, however, the 
description of Europe also becomes insubstantial- a not-Africa. Inevitably he, like his 
author, realises his inability to write stems from his language's historical dislocation 
from its concrete space of reference: a dislocation that prevents a concrete implication 
to his signifiers of place (London or Cape Town). 
Because of its dislocation from a fixed emotional referent, and because it is the 
only place where he can "explore the artistic depths", London itself is tied to his self-
location within a Kunstlerroman. So he makes the metatextual identification of 
himself with a character in a novel: 
Novels are full of chance meetings that lead to romance 
- romance or tragedy. He is ready for romance, ready even for 
tragedy, ready for anything, in fact, so long as he will be 
consumed by it and remade. That is why he is in London, after 
all: to be rid of his old self and revealed in his new, true, 
passionate self; and now there is no impediment to his quest. 
(Coetzee 2002a: 111) 
Even as London has become the stage for the novelisation of his life, the 
realities of living in "a city of winter where one plods through each day with nothing 
to look forward to but nightfall and bedtime and oblivion" lead him to idealise exactly 
that place he was so eager to leave. (Coetzee 2002a: 113) So Cape Town and South 
Africa become increasingly the situations of solace and relief, culminating with his 
declaration that it is "his country, the country of his heart." (Coetzee 2002a: 137) 
Indeed, while London loses its overt mystery as a cultural icon, John construes 
it as a ground of contestation - a place of testing, for a young man who finds himself 











illusion of London as a location of desire becomes mediated by the perception of 
London as a place of artistic testing -
Through these balmy, summer days, which seem made 
for ease and pleasure, the testing continues: what part is being 
tested he is no longer sure. Sometimes it seems he is being 
tested simply for testing's sake, to see whether he will endure 
the test. (Coetzee 2002a: 113) 
Not only does this passage evince Coetzee's debt to Beckett, with its play on 
the different grammatical permutations oftest, it suggests the obsessive insistence on 
the part of John in seeing London as a "testing ground." For "he cannot accept that the 
life he is leading here in London is without plan or meaning." (Coetzee 2002a: 59) 
Though "South Africa is a wound within him", "an albatross round his neck" 
(Coetzee 2002a: 116; 101), it provides the counterpoint of ease and mediocrity that 
paradoxically reinforces his desire to remain in London and "be tested." 
Across these shifting perceptions of London and Cape Town remains the 
imposition of binary identities - each represents only what the other is not. So he 
justifies his ill-treatment of another South African girl, Marianne, by affecting 
detachment about the potential ramifications "back horne": 
He belongs to two worlds tightly sealed from each 
other. In the world of South Africa he is no more than a ghost, 
a wisp of smoke fast dwindling away, soon to have vanished 
for good. As for London, he is good as unknown here. 
(Coetzee 2002a: 130-131) 
In fact, located as the text predominantly is, in the realm of the self-
interrogatory, the physical locations of Cape Town and London, become sites of intra-
personal contestation, rather than places external to these shifting emotional referents 
John imposes on them. London and Cape Town correspond to the generic markers 
that John sets up for them: London, as the place of the artist, and Cape Town, as the 
place from which the artist must escape. Setting and place in Youth are markers for 
generic structures: they point more to the generic assumptions of their focaliser than 
to the locatability ofCoetzee's text. So Margaret Lenta notes that "surface is almost 











environment, is "turned inward. ",,26 Although its links to biographical fact necessitate 
some external referent - i.e. the cities - they are conflated, in the manner ofT.S. Eliot 
and Charles Baudelaire before, with the subjective mind that observes them. They 
become "Unreal" as their "ideal identity" conflicts with the lived experience oftheir 
realities. 
While John interrogates the lived experience of his current moment when he 
lives in London, his fetishising of South Africa compounds the growing realisation on 
the part of the reader that the distance from any actual situation will always have the 
capacity to overwhelm the lived experience with the ideal, and idealised. 
In his rewriting ofT.S. Eliot's famous "What is a Classic?" lecture, J.M. 
Coetzee examines the biographical significances behind the lecture in coming to some 
answer for this problem.27 His response is to draw two possible ways of understanding 
Eliot's own attempts to tum his experiences into poetic material whilst in London: 
One, broadly sympathetic, is to treat these 
transcendental experiences as the subject's point of origin and 
read the entirety of the rest of the enterprise in their light 
[according to Eliot's own principle of "entelechy"] ... That is, 
it would read Eliot very much in his own framework, the 
framework he elected for himself when he defined tradition as 
an order you cannot escape, in which you may try to locate 
yourself, but in which your place gets to be defined, and 
continually redefined, by succeeding generations - an entirely 
transpersonal order, in fact. (Coetzee 2002b: 7) 
This way, the self-defined position within a poetic order, parallels 
John's self-imposed situation as an artist, and as an artist whose meaning-
for-life is found in the high culture of the metropolis, rather than in the 
humdrum of everyday life. 
The other (and broadly unsympathetic) way of 
understanding Eliot is the sociocultural one I outlined a 
moment ago: of treating his efforts as the essentially magical 
enterprise of a man trying to redefine the world around 
himself - America, Europe - rather than confronting the 











academic, Eurocentric education had prepared him for little 
else but life as a mandarin in one of the New England ivory 
towers. (Coetzee 2002b: 7) 
The irony with which John is depicted - the excessive seriousness, the denial of 
possible mediocrity - simultaneously sets up a parodic double-voice in the narrative 
and demonstrates an authorial sympathy for his acute feelings of alienness as a 
provincial in the metropole.28 John, as a character, conforms to the sociocultural type 
of the colonial or provincial, who, in defining themselves with the metropole in 
antithesis to the province or colony, evidence the gap between "their inherited 
culture" and "their daily experience." (Coetzee 2002b: 6) 
Yet, critically, even as circumstances act to disprove this separation, the 
treatment of each location seems particularly similar as idealised concepts, rather than 
actual locations. But while the central consciousness John fixes on London and Cape 
T own as tropes in the literary shaping of his life, Coetzee distances himself from his 
youthful incarnation by using the third person and the principle of autrebiography, or 
younger self as other, suggested by Lenta. In this way, London (and Cape 
Town/South Africa) becomes important as the setting of a dialogic conflict between 
author and hero. 
In counterpoising the interview with the act of writing, Coetzee noted that 
"writing is not free expression." To reiterate: 
There is a true sense in which writing is dialogic: a 
matter of awakening the countervoices in oneself and 
embarking upon speech with them. It is some measure of a 
writer's seriousness whether he does evoke/invoke those 
countervoices in himself. (Coetzee 1992: 65) 
Dialogism, of course, occurs on the threshold between the voices of the 
characters ("countervoices") and the implicit judgment of the author in depicting 
them. Our opinions on the characters are inextricably linked to the manner in which 
they are presented. So when John responds to a disapproving letter from his cousin, "1 
am hard enough on myself, he tells himself; 1 do not need the help of others. It is a 
sophistry he falls back on time and again to block his ears to criticism" (Coetzee 











reflection without forming an opinion about his age, his maturity, his regard for 
others. Although the term "sophistry" suggests a degree of self-awareness, the 
difference in this occurrence and the later occurrence in the aforementioned 
"Experience" passage identifies John as a young man, who, in perceiving himself so 
manifestly different, proves he conforms to type. Moreover, to accuse the self of 
sophistry implies sophistry in one's self perception, as one may not be aware of one's 
sophistry without simultaneously adopting some ironic distance to both the self and 
the opinions expressed by the self. Therefore, whether the judgment is John's (as 
"hero" ofthe narrative) or Coetzee's as author, the very term creates a space or 
distance between the meaning of the phrase and its implication. 
John, on days when the test of tiredness overwhelms him, "allows himself the 
luxury of dipping into books about the South Africa of the old days." (Coetzee 2002a: 
136-137) In his fascinated reading of the accounts written by travellers to his 
homeland, while he lives in the heart of their homeland, he finds himself questioning 
whether he is afflicted by patriotism. "Is he proving himself unable to live without a 
country?" he asks himself. However, he realises there exists a more profound, 
ontological reason to this fascination. While London is "by now wrapped in centuries 
of words", Cape Town and the South African hinterland - the Karoo - have no such 
textual identity. Without "this handful of books, he could not be sure he not dreamed 
up the Karoo yesterday." (Coetzee 2002a: 137) His identity, already explicitly if 
begrudgingly connected with the Karoo and South Africa, requires the authentication 
the travel books provide. The authenticity of their depictions, however, only occurs in 
their capacity as travel books of course. The reassurance they provide is restricted to 
the aesthetics of the genre they inhabit. 
Coetzee suggests something similar in the negative, when he worries about the 
"easy" biographical explanations that an overly familiar setting may engender: 
What is left of Kafka after the alienation of Josef K has 
been explained in terms of Kafka's marginality? What is left 
of Michael K after he has been explained in terms of my 
marginality in Africa? (Coetzee 1992: 199) 
There is a crucial elision in Coetzee's doubling of Kafka's situation with his 
own.29 If, as it seems, Coetzee is repeating the form of the sentence to make a 











only takes the place of Kafka, as a rhetorical position in the question, but the place of 
Coetzee as the author ofthe piece. What is left, Coetzee asks, of Michael K? Not, 
what is left of John Coetzee? This example of the elision of the writer acts to replace 
the writer with his literary creations, a theme Coetzee explores more specifically in 
his dealings with Robinson Crusoe and Daniel Defoe. 
Not only is Coetzee's novel, Foe, an explicit retelling of the Crusoe story, 
mapping the story's migrancy from the situation of its happening to the site of its 
writing, but it is Coetzee who introduces the 1999 Oxford University Press edition of 
The Life and Strange Sur prizing Adventures of Robinson Crusoe. 30 Moreover, in a 
statement that resonates with Coetzee's on Michael K, Edgar Allan Poe is quoted by 
Coetzee as writing, 
Not one person in ten, nay, not one person in five 
hundred, has, during the perusal of "Robinson Crusoe," the 
most remote conception that any particle of genius, or even of 
common talent, has been employed in its creation! Men do not 
look upon it in the light of a literary performance. Defoe has 
none of their thoughts - Robinson all. (Coetzee 1999: vi) 
Coetzee's gloss is to call it "a tribute" albeit a backhanded one "that [an author] 
should be eclipsed by one of his creations." (Coetzee 1999: vi) While he recognises 
Defoe's adherence to the general tenets of realism, Coetzee explains this as the result 
of Defoe's empiricism. "Defoe is in fact something simpler: an impersonator, a 
ventriloquist, even a forger (his Journal of the Plague Year is as close to a forgery of 
a historical document as one can get without beginning to play with ink and old 
paper)." (Coetzee 1999: vii) Of course, the close-to-forgery of the historical document 
has appeared in Coetzee's oeuvre, first with the publication of Dusklands, later with 
John's expressed desire to write a book like Dusklands - that will of course, in the 
future anterior, become Dusklands - although: 
It is not a forgery he is contemplating. People have tried 
that route before: pretended to find, in a chest in the attic in a 
country-house, ajoumal, yellow with age ... The challenge he 
faces is a purely literary one: to write a book whose horizon of 
knowledge will be that of Burchell's time, the 1820' s ... 











In "The Novel Today", Coetzee sets up the novel as the antagonist of history. 
But he also expresses his awareness that his speech "will be recuperated by next week 
into the discourse of history." (Coetzee 1988a: 3) His address is on an occasion where 
the charge "is to address what are called problems and issues." As such the 
metalanguage of his speech remains "one that is liable, at any moment, to find itself 
flattened and translated back and down into the discourse of politics." (Coetzee 
1988a: 3) His solution on this occasion was to tell a parable, "a mode favoured by 
marginal groups - groups that don't have a place in the mainstream, in the main plot 
of history - because it is hard to pin down unequivocally what the point is." (Coetzee 
1988a: 4) Later, with the framing narrative of Elizabeth Costello, he managed to 
encapsulate his historical statements in the language of fiction: what one assumes is 
the speaking of his own language. (Coetzee 1988a: 3) 
While the novel seeks to evade the locality of history, it is inevitably tied to a 
history - the history it creates. Within the abstruseness of textual discourse, there 
remains a necessary adherence to context. However, by bringing that context into 
question, the history remains open to question. The differend is the settlement on a 
discourse. But identifying the differend is the subversion of that settlement: it brings 
what has been considered fact into the position of assertion and claim. The mere 
questioning of fact opens up the possibility for a counter-discourse. That possibility 
brings with it the recognition, if not the emplacement, of a poetics of reciprocity: a 
poetics that acknowledges, ethically and aesthetically, the place of reciprocity. 
At one point the Introduction of this dissertation refers to Coetzee' s discussion 
of the Colour Bar Act in his "Jerusalem Prize Acceptance Speech." The focus, at that 
stage in the argument, was to address the "failure of love" as a reciprocal engagement 
with an abstract Other. However, Coetzee's words have a locality that is particularly 
significant when reread in relation to the issues of genre and setting: 
What was the meaning of this deeply symbolical law? 
Its origins, it seems to me, lie in fear and denial: denial of an 
unacknowledgable desire to embrace Africa, embrace the 
body of Africa; and a fear of being embraced in return by 
Africa. (Coetzee 1992: 97) 
For, if the crudity oflife in South Africa dictates the genres to which the South 











earlier fictions bring to bear the marginalised voices of their dominant characters. For 
it is when the dominant characters of Coetzee' s fictions transgress the laws of their 
particular lands that their social standing is shown to be secondary to their marginality 
before that law. The law, as Coetzee presents it, remains above regard because it 
relies on an unacknowledged fallacy: its supremacy as law is recognised primarily 
because it fits into the genre of the law. It is by virtue of the inability of the law to 
examine interrogate its own presumptions of rightness that characters such as the 
Magistrate and David Lurie find themselves occupying the gaps between the 
generality of the law's application and the specificity of their particular cases. 
The fear of being embraced in return by Africa is a fear of reciprocal 
indebtedness to Africa. When Mrs Curren finally allows herself to be embraced at the 
end of Age of Iron, there is still no warmth in the encounter: that the embrace is the 
final description in the novel suggests that it leads Mrs Curren to lose power over the 
process of her narrative. For all the insistence on the benefits of an "ethic of gratitude" 
in Chapter Two, its generic consequence in the Africa of Coetzee' s novels is a 
renunciation of narrative dominance playing directly into a fear of semantic 
marginality. 
Coetzee's move from South Africa to Australia marks a particularly important 
transition. For, if the works up until Disgrace have some measure of South African 
specificity, and if Youth functions as a critical account ofCoetzee's early 
establishment of the novel genre and the setting of the novel as co-dependent factors 
of a work, then Coetzee's departure from South Africa correlates with the setting-less 
nature of Elizabeth Costello and the Adelaide-based Slow Man. 
Slow Man's more sympathetic approach to receiving care demonstrates a 
progression from the agonistic situation of Mrs Curren in Age of Iron. Attempting to 
argue this on the basis of setting is particularly questionable. Before the genre of the 
differend, however, it seems particularly important to note the setting in locating that 
genre - either as a legal dilemma, an ethical problem, or an aesthetic choice. It is the 
engagement with each of these issues as an aesthetic project that mark Coetzee's use 
of a poetics of reciprocity. 
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Conclusion: A Letter from Lady Chandos 
Where words give way beneath your feet like rotting boards 
- J.M. Coetzee, Elizabeth Costello 
Justin Cartwright's review ofCoetzee's Inner Workings: Essays 2000-2005 
attempts a reading of Slow Man based on an essay from the collection entitled "Philip 
Roth, The Plot against America."[ Cartwright quotes from the Roth piece, 
A novelist as seasoned as Roth knows that the stories we 
set about writing sometimes begin to write themselves, after 
which their truth or falsehood is out of our hands and 
declarations of authorial intent carry no weight. Furthermore, 
once a book is launched into the world, it becomes the 
property of its readers, who, given half a chance, will twist its 
meaning in accord with their own preconceptions and desires. 
Roth ... reminds us that, though Franz Kafka did not write his 
novels as political allegories, East Europeans under 
Communist rule read them as such and put them to work for 
political ends? 
Cartwright interprets Slow Man as an "invitation" for readers to "make their 
own meanings." Moreover, according to Cartwright, the novel becomes "a 
justification" for "the idea that poetry is truer than history." (Cartwright 2007: 2) 
Given that Coetzee's essay on Paul Celan in the same volume questions Hans-Georg 
Gadamer's more rigorous argument for a similar principle, I must disagree with his 
reading. 3 Of interest, however, is the manner by which he arrives at this reading. 
Cartwright observes that the phrase roman a clef occurs with particular frequency in 
this collection. In response to the notion of the 'novel with a key', Cartwright uses the 
Roth essay as a key to 'unlocking' the meaning of Slow Man. 
The irony of using the quote he used lies in the sad reflection that a work will be 
examined as a roman a clef despite all efforts on the part of the author to suggest the 
contrary: that a story may have a remainder beyond the message and the covering of 
that message. Stories may indeed have messages. But if they are to be more than 











way of a concluding example for this study, I tum to the "Letter of Elizabeth, Lady 
Chandos, to Francis Bacon.,,4 
The letter that concludes Elizabeth Costello is a disturbing postscript to the 
novel for two reasons. The first is its discrepancy from the rest of the novel. Each 
"lesson" has involved an Australian novelist, Elizabeth Costello, presenting her 
thoughts on particular issues to some audience. Each lesson has been clearly labelled 
as pertinent to a specific issue and each audience has been specifically delineated.5 
The letter, however, has no neat label to designate its "issue' and its audience is a man 
who has been dead for almost four hundred years. The second reason is its desperate 
plea for salvation that, 'revealed' almost four hundred years after its articulation, must 
come, if it is possible, far too late to be of any help. 
Elizabeth C's letter, like Foe, is a fiction based on the paratextual relationship it 
forms with another fiction. Foe's paratext is Daniel Defoe's Robinson Crusoe; 
Elizabeth's letter is Hugo von Hofinannsthal's "Letter of Lord Chandos to Lord 
Bacon." Hofmannsthal's letter posits a relationship between a fictional Philip, Lord 
Chandos, and the rationalist Francis Bacon. It details the collapse of Philip's recourses 
to rationalism, reason and language before "the condition of [his] inner self.,,6 He 
describes his position of certainty about his rational understanding of nature: 
[At] times I divined that all was allegory and that each 
creature was a key to all the others; and I felt myself the one 
capable of seizing each by the handle and unlocking as many 
of the others as were ready to yield. (Hofmannsthal 2007) 
As his condition progresses, however, he ceases to see nature as a rationally 
accessible series of interlinking keys. "For me everything disintegrated into parts, 
those parts again into parts; no longer would anything let itself be encompassed by 
one idea." (HofmannsthaI2007) Elizabeth, in commenting on her 'husband's' letter, 
changes the tense of Philip's divination to "all is allegory." (Coetzee 2004b: 229) 
Given the vicissitudes of translation, it is possible that Hofmannsthal's words are 
better translated in the present tense or that Coetzee misread the original. The impact 
of the shift, however, shows the insoluble nature of the problem that Hofmannsthal 
and Coetzee both face: that of articulating the remainder or the something-else of a 











neither Latin nor English, neither Italian nor Spanish, 
but a language none of whose words is known to me, a lan-
guage in which inanimate things speak to me and wherein I 
may one day have to justify myself before an unknown judge. 
(HofmannsthaI2007) 
Hofmannsthal is careful to show the inadequacy of his approach through the 
self-reflexive writings of a fictional character. Coetzee increases the distance between 
the manner and the matter: he creates the fictional paratext of an elided victim of 
Philip's condition. But Coetzee also observes that it remains allegorical. At best it is 
by gesturing "not [to] what I say but something else" that something may be salvaged 
(Coetzee 2004b: 228) 
The consequence ofthis deferral to "something else" is both symptomatic of the 
curse Philip and Elizabeth (and, in some deferred manner, possibly Hofmannsthal and 
Coetzee) suffer and indicative of the name by which this curse may be comprehended 
(though not, ultimately, either cured or fully understood). Their relationship with 
other things is not one that can be fully rationalised or understood, because the 
rationality or understanding denies those elements with which the other things 
reciprocate the relationship. Incapable of finding an idiom for feelings that want to be 
articulated but cannot be, Philip and Elizabeth are befuddled by their inability to make 
sense of their stories as roman a clefs waiting to be unlocked. 
It is a similar befuddlement to that suffered by the Magistrate and David Lurie 
when they are denied the voice on which so much of their identity hinges. Neither the 
Magistrate nor Lurie can articulate a response to their situation because their situation 
precipitates their collapse into positions similar to those of Philip and Elizabeth - a 
position inadequate to articulating the acceptance of the presence of an other. 
In this there is a strong resonance with the problems faced in setting up an 
"ethic of gratitude." For the acknowledgement of the other's right to respond stems 
from the ability to accept the other's presence outside the parameters of one's own 
discourse. While Paul Rayment seems to find some solace in accepting his situation as 
Marijana's friend rather than lover, Mrs Curren's inability to contact her daughter is 
the inability to acknowledge the reciprocal right of her daughter to respond to the 











Lurie, the Magistrate, Rayment and Mrs Curren demonstrate some possible 
responses to the vicissitudes of life. However, those lives remain thematic vehicles for 
Coetzee's writing. Although their efforts at reciprocity are finely depicted, it is the 
artistic construction oftheir interactions that ultimately brings about a poetics of 
reciprocity in the novels they inhabit. In that respect, it is precisely their fictionality -
their positions as objects of fiction - that enables their depiction to be aesthetically 
functional. It is their generic identity - fictional character - as it relates to the ethical 
dimensions of their intratextual actions, that the aesthetic and the ethical come 
together to form the poetics of reciprocity. 
There is a differend in this: for as objects of fiction, none of Coetzee' s 
characters can "speak" for themselves. But it is a differend that has been identified. 
For Coetzee' s self-referential manner of writing ensures that the lack of freedom felt 
by the characters as fictional objects is understood by the characters in their 
intratextual interactions. The correspondences between genre, content, setting and 
aesthetic erupt the bounds of the text - an irruption that parodies the inability of 
characters to move, as Elizabeth Costello does, from one text to another. 
Couching the exchange between Philip and Elizabeth in the genre of letters 
directed to an absent third party, Coetzee shows his ability to play with genre and with 
setting to offset attempts at an "easy" reading. Yet playing on the limits and 
advantages of genre shows the reciprocal benefits involved in writing with full 
consciousness of writing's inadequacies. Elizabeth Costello avoids the generic 
structures of both lecture hall and reading room: the need to be either a well-argued 
truth or a well-articulated fiction. By presenting itself as both, and as neither, 
Elizabeth Costello offsets its own heterogeneity of setting with heterogeneity of 
genre. Costello both is and is not Coetzee's amanuensis. The chapters are and are not 
"lessons." They are and are no longer lectures presented by Coetzee, by Costello, by 
the framing narrative. It is, however, in this capacity as being both and neither at the 
same time, that Elizabeth Costello represents a transition away from the South 
African setting in Coetzee's prose to a prose that divorces itself from the necessary 
ties both to setting and to genre. Slow Man's setting in Adelaide is curiously devoid of 
Australian-specific detail, suggesting the tum of Coetzee' s prose, despite his attempt 
to inscribe himself into Australian history, away from a reciprocal aesthetic between 











Coetzee's forthcoming novel, Diary of a Bad Year, will no doubt revise and 
recondition this notion of the ethical-aesthetic poetics of reciprocity. 
The complications of reciprocal relationships are problematic precisely because 
they are irresolvable. But Coetzee's fictions show that the complications are only 
problematic if one approaches reciprocal relationships as an issue that needs to be 
resolved. While one "cannot live thus", it is perhaps the role of Coetzee' s fictions to 
ask the question: why not? 
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